Early Christian Responses to Purported Parallels of Resurrection Myths

(avg. read time: 13–27 mins.)

The claim that stories about Jesus—particularly the gospel story of his resurrection—are in some sense derivative of myths about gods and heroes has been a recurrent trope in scholarly and popular literature. The validity, veracity, and significance of the claimed derivations also continues to be debated, including of the old category of “dying and rising gods.”¹ It is also a popular subject in anti-Christian and apologetic polemics.

Among critics of Christianity, the claim that either Christianity derives from myths about dying and rising gods or, at least, that it should be treated in the same fashion has frequently ebbed and flowed in popularity.² Some also make the connection with mythology for one reason or another without necessarily having the same agenda.³ Christians, especially apologists, have responded to these claims in two overarching fashions. One approach, which seems to be the minority approach, takes for granted the similarities (at least in broad terms, if not in the details) of Jesus’s resurrection with these stories and seeks to explain the commonalities in a fashion amenable to Christ being the unique truth to which the myths point. The most famous exemplar of this response is J. R. R. Tolkien in his “On Fairy-Stories” and in his conversation with C. S. Lewis that led to the latter’s conversion,⁴ but it also has some more recent advocates.⁵ The other approach has been to undermine superficial similarities, especially by focusing on the differences between the myths and the Gospels or early Christian gospel proclamation, or by arguing that the relevant developments happened too late to influence Christianity in this regard.⁶ The stress on discontinuity also appears among sources that are not so apologetically oriented or have a broader focus.⁷

But there is an aspect of this debate that I do not think has been given sufficient attention to this point. To my knowledge, no one has provided a focused, extensive analysis of how the ancient Christians responded to the posited parallels insofar as they did (e.g., no early Christian responded to the supposed parallel of Mithras or show any awareness of any such story, and we have no reference from ancient sources saying he died and rose).⁸ They lived in a time when these myths were better known, told, enacted, portrayed, and shaped in a variety of familiar and formal settings.⁹ As today, these parallels were not a dominant theme in Christian/non-Christian interactions (direct and indirect), but the ancients did address them. What, then, did they have to say on the subject? As a matter of fact, they had a variety of responses. It was a variety that I do not think Robert M. Grant sufficiently grasped when he attempted to explain the early Christian dedication to expressing belief in the resurrection of the flesh: “If they were to defend their faith from critical opponents, they had to insist on the novelty of the resurrection. Other gods died and rose; only Jesus rose in the flesh.”¹⁰ As a matter of fact, this consideration does not appear to have influenced the matter of our focus at all.

In the course of my documenting what the ancient authors wrote in the first five centuries of the Church’s history, when “pagan”/Greco-Roman critics and stories were still more frequently addressed in ancient writings for particularly apologetic purposes,¹¹ I argue that one can discern three types of responses to purported parallels of the gospel story of Jesus’s resurrection or of the eschatological resurrection. One type of response assumed belief in these stories for the sake of the argument. A second type of response that has remained the most popular among Christian apologists is to explicitly deny that these stories are equivalent in terms of being relevantly and sufficiently similar. A third type of response is related to the second, except that the denial is implicit, whether because purported parallels are not listed or because they only mention the death of the god or hero despite a resurrection story being attached to them at the time.¹²

Assumed for the Sake of Argument

The first five centuries feature three representatives of this approach with extant writings. The first is Theophilus of Antioch. In his defense of belief in the resurrection of the dead, he insists that his addressee Autolycus cannot object to the eschatological resurrection on the grounds that none have been raised from dead when he believes that Heracles lived (ζάω) after burning himself, a story which was over half a millennium old by the time of Theophilus, and that Asclepius was raised (ἐγείρω) after being struck by lightning (Autol. 1.13).¹³ Theophilus does not go on to explore these stories or make much else of them, as the focus of this chapter in his first book is on listing natural examples in an attempt to show that resurrection is intrinsic to how the cosmos works.

The fact that he merely assumes this belief in the heroes’ resurrection for the sake of the argument, not that he actually believed these stories, is further demonstrated by ch. 9 earlier in the book. He thinks the gods are simply dead men who are worshiped. Against the polytheists, he argues that these gods are not worshipful due to their vicious conduct, and that the gods are shown to be mortal (cf. 3.29). Among the many examples he lists are Heracles, Dionysus, Osiris, Attis, Adonis, and Asclepius.¹⁴ Theophilus was likely aware, as he was in at least the case of Heracles (and in the case of Asclepius by his own assertion), that most of these gods and heroes had resurrection stories attached to their names in some form, but he says that they simply died. In this sense, he also exemplifies a pattern that we will see in the third response of implicit denial later.¹⁵

The second example is Epiphanius of Salamis. In his Ancoratus, as part of a larger defense of belief in the resurrection of flesh against those who would deny the same (82–100), he notes that the “unbelieving Hellenes and barbarians” (85.1) speak of resurrection (ἀνάστασις) in their own myths.¹⁶ As his first example, he cites Alcestis being raised (ἐγείρω) by Heracles (85.2), which was a rather popular story, even being related in Euripides’s play named for her.¹⁷ He also notes Pelops (who was restored by the gods after being cut to pieces by his father, except for one of his shoulders), Amphiaraus (raised by Asclepius), Glaucus (raised by Polyeidos), Castor (who was rescued by Pollux appealing to Zeus to share half of his immortality, so that they could alternate between Olympus and Hades every other day), and Protesilaus (85.2–3).¹⁸ He even continues in mentioning others who are not resurrected but face bodily torment in Tartarus (85.4–5). Of course, as mentioned in n. 18 and despite Epiphanius’s description of “resurrection,” not all of these examples are of resurrection, but they do all speak to bodily fates, wherein some everlasting consequence is attached to the body, thus they still contribute to his point, even as the examples of people in Tartartus do.

The third example is Aeneas of Gaza in his Theophrastus through his mouthpiece Euxitheus.¹⁹ Near the end of the dialogue, the argument presented is that the Christian claim about the resurrection of the dead should not be considered unbelievable to the pagan because of the several stories of resurrection the Greeks are already familiar with. He notes the examples of Polyeidos raising Glaucus, Asclepius raising Hippolytus or Tyndareus, and Heracles raising Alcestis, Theseus, Tymon the Lydian, and Timosthenes the Athenian.²⁰ These provide parallels for Jesus’s own resurrection miracles, although Aeneas/Euxitheus does not draw attention to such a parallel. He also points to the story of Aristeas of Proconnesus as related by Pindar and Herodotus as a more extreme/absurd example of illustrating the plausibility of resurrection among the pagans, despite their disbelief of Christian resurrection at the eschaton (63–64).²¹ And in case his interlocutor should deny the stories related by the poets (and the historian Herodotus), he also points to the case of resurrection of Harmonios from Plato’s Republic 10.614b (there named Er, which Origen also cites in Cels. 2.16), as well as Zoroaster’s teaching that there will be resurrection.

One should note, though, that Aeneas’s use of these examples is curious. He is supposed to be responding to objections of the body being resurrected after complete decay of the flesh (57–58). But these examples that he cites from mythology are what Dag Øistein Endsjø often refers to as cases of “absolute bodily continuity” in resurrection.²² They either involve returns from the underworld, reconstitution, or resurrections before the complete decay of the flesh. It seems that, as in the case of his addressing the argument from the chain of consumption (54–55), he has missed the point in this particular area of his response.²³

It is also notable that in each of these cases, the parallels are assumed for the sake of an argument for the general eschatological resurrection, not for Jesus’s resurrection. This fact sets these teachers apart from more recent examples of Christians who assume general parallels with Jesus for the sake of an argument wherein these parallels serve as preparation for the gospel. These Christians note differences along the axes of historicity and particular details in the stories while maintaining the broad similarities of resurrection from the dead. But the earlier Christians use them as examples against their opponents who deny the general resurrection of the dead or of the flesh.

Explicit Denial of Equivalence or True Parallel

The two representatives of the second category deny that the figures who are described as resurrected are proper parallels because they are counterfeits spread by the devil, because there are conflicting stories about these events depending on the source, or simply because they did not happen, unlike Jesus’s resurrection. The first representative of this response is Justin Martyr in his Dialogue with Trypho 69.²⁴ He points to three examples of the devil counterfeiting what the Scriptures said before Christ’s advent: Dionysus, Heracles, and Asclepius. As noted previously, Heracles had a story of resurrection after his death linked to him for centuries, but Justin only references Dionysus’s resurrection (ἀνίστημι), and that as part of a reference to how Dionysus counterfeits the three-part narrative pattern of the gospel in how he died, rose again, and ascended to heaven. Justin does not explicitly mention Heracles’s resurrection, but only his ascension after death as a counterfeit of Jesus.

Asclepius’s counterfeit of Jesus is how he was said to be a raiser (ἀνεγείρω) of the dead and healer.²⁵ The prophecy Justin says he counterfeits is a quote from Isa 35:1–6 (LXX), one of the texts that informs Jesus’s answer to John the Baptist in Matt 11:4–5 // Luke 7:22. Indeed, it appears to be to this text that Justin alludes in his reference to how Jesus fulfilled this text. But he takes the argument one step further to say that those who recognize who Jesus revealed himself to be by deeds such as these will themselves be raised (ἀνίστημι) by Jesus in a completely sound body at his second advent (something that Asclepius cannot counterfeit).

The second example is Origen, who provides by far the most extensive interaction with claims of resurrection parallels of any early Christian author, and thereby demonstrates the familiarity with mythology a well-educated Christian teacher could have had. He responds to and expands on examples from Celsus,²⁶ who insists that the claims of Jesus’s resurrection ought to be treated no more seriously than many other similar stories.²⁷ As with Justin, Origen posits that the devil sought to dilute the testimony of the resurrection (ἀνάστασις) by spreading similar reports of others rising from the dead (Cels. 2.16). But in this case, he provides no specific examples. It is only later in Book 2 that Celsus and Origen get specific.

A Jewish character that serves as a mouthpiece for Celsus lists as analogies for Jesus the following examples: Zamolxis, Pythagoras, Rhampsinitus, Orpheus, Protesilaus in Thessaly, Heracles in Taenarus, and Theseus (2.54–55).²⁸ Despite all these stories, the Jewish speaker says that no one has ever actually arisen (ἀνίστημι) after death and that Jesus’s story is as empty of historical reality as these others. In response, Origen notes how Celsus’s Jewish mouthpiece does not know his own Scripture if he thinks that no one has been raised from the dead, as he cites the stories of miracles of Elijah and Elisha (2.57).²⁹As for the other stories, he agrees that the events associated with Zamolxis, Pythagoras, and Rhampsinitus are cases of them performing deceptive marvels (or “juggling tricks,” τερατεύομαι), and that the other events are better described as people withdrawing themselves from the sight of others and then passed themselves off as having risen from the dead (ἀνίστημι ἐκ νεκρῶν; 2.55–56, 58). But he insists that Jesus’s case could not be accounted for like these stories, as he was publicly crucified, there were eyewitnesses who met the risen Christ, and the disciples who declared his resurrection did so at the risk of their lives (2.56). Furthermore, Jesus’s resurrection makes sense in the context of his prophecy of the same, his consequent fulfillment of scriptural prophecy (which he stresses that he and his fellow Christians share with Celsus’s Jew), and of how much good has come into the world as a result of his resurrection (2.58). His resurrection is superior to any of the counterfeits and even of the stories of Elijah and Elisha, because the Father himself raised (ἀνίστημι) Jesus from the dead (2.58).

In the third volume, Origen responds to Celsus’s list of men who became gods after their deaths: the Dioscuri, Heracles, Asclepius, and Dionysus. Of these, Origen only explicitly references the Dioscuri as living (ζάω) and dying in turns (3.22–23). But he previously referenced Heracles’s alleged resurrection—although it is unclear if he has that story in mind or the story of his resurrection after his literal death, as told by Eudoxus—and he shows later that he knows of stories of Asclepius continuing to be seen after his death (3.24–25). It is possible that Celsus lists these individuals as those who were claimed to become gods after their deaths because of the resurrection stories associated with them. That is, after their deaths, they were raised from the dead or otherwise immortalized. Resurrection itself did not divinize them, but it was a crucial event for such a transition. In all cases, he says that these stories are starkly different in character from Jesus’s, in that the resurrected Jesus was seen by eyewitnesses of his ministry and that those who thereafter proclaimed his resurrection and gospel were willing to face suffering and death for his sake (unlike those who regarded these others as gods). Furthermore, Jesus is rightly regarded as God in contrast to these ones who are claimed to be gods because of their powers. After all, powers like healing or prophecy may be the attributes of good or evil beings, and so one must look to how the person embodies virtue. Jesus embodied virtue perfectly and, although this is only implied in Origen’s argument, his resurrection is further demonstration of his virtue in that God vindicated him after his sentence to death by crucifixion (cf. 3.31–33).

A more disputed case of connecting resurrection and the reception of divine honors is Aristeas of Proconnesus, the next analogy that Celsus cites (3.26).³⁰ Aristeas is said to have been seen alive after his death in a fuller’s shop and that people hundreds of years later would still see him. He was even treated with divine honors by the Metapontines by the command of Apollos. On the one hand, Origen responds to the supposed analogy of Aristeas by noting that the witness testimony is incomparable, since, as noted already, the disciples were eyewitnesses of his ministry and were willing to face suffering and death for their testimony, and Jesus’s resurrection was for a clear salvific purpose, as opposed to the apparently purposeless resurrection of Aristeas (3.27–28). As for the divine honors, Origen challenges this on the grounds that there is once again no great purpose of benefit for humans in Apollos’s command to give Aristeas divine honors, alleging that this is yet another example of counterfeit testimony by demons to hinder the spread of the gospel by parody (cf. 3.34–38). Indeed, he notes that the Metapontines ultimately have not maintained any practices of divine honors for Aristeas, as they rightly perceived there was no reason for them (3.29).

While these sections have the most focus on the alleged analogies of Jesus in Celsus’s argument, Origen returns to similar subjects in later books. In one case, he responds to Celsus’s comparisons of Jesus’s death with the deaths of various heroes, including Heracles, Asclepius, and Orpheus, which he discussed previously. But the resurrections of the first two are never referenced (and the term does not rightly apply to Orpheus in any case), as the point of comparison is the manner of death and how the subjects faced it (7.53–55). Likewise, he reiterates an implicit contrast to earlier cited examples of mortals receiving divine honors after their deaths in that he argues that Jesus alone is the proper recipient of worship, because God commanded such worship (8.9–11). Thus, as with Theophilus, he also contributes to a precedent for the third kind of response.

Implicit Denial of Equivalence or True Parallel

More frequent than either of these options is the implicit denial of the claimed resurrection of these figures by not referencing them in contexts where they might otherwise be known and relevant. We have already noted patterns of this in Theophilus and Origen, who represented each of the previous two types of response elsewhere in their work. Yet, at other points, they write as if the parallels either do not exist (which is obviously not true) or, in fact, they are not worth addressing (for whatever reason). This is the way of implicit denial of parallel of these stories to Jesus where one author was explicit in his denial previously.

Still, the earliest instance of this way of implicit denial is Aristides in his Apology addressed to Hadrian.³¹ As part of his critique of the Greek gods and their worthiness to be considered gods, the non-Olympian examples he cites all have resurrection stories (or at least returns from death) attached to them. Specifically, he mentions Asclepius, Dionysus, Heracles, and Adonis (identified as Tammuz in the Syriac translation; 10–11).³² But he only mentions their deaths, for it is as a result of their deaths that he insists that they ought not be considered gods. The same point applies to the reference to Osiris in Aristides’s critique of the Egyptian gods (12).³³ Aristides is surely aware that these various gods are considered as alive, not still dead, and hence that resurrection is a necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition to their continued worship as gods. But by simply saying that they died, he implicitly denies the stories of their resurrection. This implicit contrast is further demonstrated by the fact that he explicitly references Jesus’s resurrection and ascension after his death (ch. 15 in the Greek; ch. 2 in the Syriac).

Justin Martyr, an example we saw of explicit denial in another work, compares various children of Jupiter—Hermes, Asclepius, Dionysus, Heracles, the sons of Leda/the Dioscuri, Perseus, and Bellerophon—to Jesus as the Son of God (1 Apol. 21). But the point of comparison is to their deaths and ascensions, while their resurrections are not referenced. After all, not all of them have resurrection stories attached to them, but all went through ascension/exaltation. Interestingly, the verb for resurrection (ἀνίστημι) appears only in reference to Jesus (in participle form). We have already seen that Justin was aware of at least Dionysus’s resurrection story, and he was aware that such miracle stories were attached to Asclepius. Thus, it is not a matter of Justin being ignorant of the stories. Instead, by passing over the resurrection details, Justin implicitly denies any resurrection claims by skipping from death to ascension and insisting that these ascension stories—along with those of Ariadne and the Caesars—are counterfeits of bodily immortalization spread by diabolic deception (cf. 54; Dial. 69).³⁴

The next representative is Minucius Felix in his only extant work Octavius.³⁵ The pagan character Caecilius Natalis mocks belief in the eschatological resurrection of the dead as being the product of “old women’s fables” and he says that no one has returned from the dead to demonstrate the veracity of this belief, even after the manner of Protesilaus (11). Caecilius clearly does not believe in the veracity of the story of Protesilaus, but it serves as an example of the sort of story one should expect to happen if there is any validity to the claim of resurrection.

This is the only example Caecilius offers, but Minucius’s Christian representative, Octavius Januarius, refers to others, yet never directly refers to Protesilaus. As part of a critique of polytheism that explicitly draws on the ideas of Euhemerus and others that the myths of the gods were based on mortals, Octavius criticizes the worship of those who were mortals, and not admirable mortals at that. At the end of ch. 21 he references consecutively the Castors (the Dioscuri) who die and live by turns, Aesculapius/Asclepius who arises to become a god after being struck by lightning, and Hercules who put off humanity in his immolation. Again, the resurrection of Hercules is not explicitly mentioned, but it may be well enough implied in his becoming a god after his immolation, since that would entail his immortalization after death, and there was a resurrection story known about him.³⁶ The same point applies to the reference to Romulus becoming a god in ch. 23.³⁷ The fact that Octavius criticizes these examples of mortals being worshiped as gods means that he does not accept the resurrection accounts, where applicable. After all, the function of such resurrection stories is to make sense of the worship of those who died, as resurrection (along with translation) was a path to immortality and deification. It is on such grounds that Octavius criticizes the stories as part of a larger polemic against idolatry (21–23).

As with some other apologetic works seen to this point, Octavius never references Jesus’s resurrection. When resurrection is referenced, it is the general resurrection. And because this is in the form of a philosophical dispute, Octavius does not cite the story of Jesus as a demonstration for resurrection belief in response to philosophers.³⁸ Rather, like Theophilus and many others, he argues that the operations of creation attest to resurrection, as does God’s power to create from nothing. As this is the focus of the argument for resurrection, Octavius apparently perceives no need to directly deny the potential parallels, or even acknowledge them as such, despite his knowledge of them in the case of Protesilaus and likely others.³⁹

One can see these various tendencies of implicit denial in several other cases among early Christian teachers. Minucius’s Euhemerist argument is elaborated in Eusebius’s work, where he insists that the gods all have their roots in mortals, hence he never mentions resurrection stories attached to Osiris, Dionysus, Heracles, Asclepius, and Attis (Praep. ev. 2.1–2), although such stories were clearly known for most of these figures at the time. Rather, their stories end at death, and this is implicit demonstration that they were humans and not gods. When he brings up such stories later, he looks for symbolic meaning in them (3.11).⁴⁰ The exception to the silence on resurrection parallels is in the reference to Horus in Praep. ev. 2.1.13. Perhaps this is due to his function as a transitional figure in Eusebius’s argument for the roots of Greek myths in Egyptian ones (2.1.12–14), as Horus is the last of the Egyptian gods and is identical to Apollos (though the story is related in terms reminiscent of Dionysus). The purported resurrection thus serves as a mythical explanation for this overlap of myths. But he clearly does not see it as a parallel to Jesus that needs to be explained. And given Eusebius’s extensive knowledge of non-Judeo-Christian culture, and since he does acknowledge a resurrection story in at least one case, it is difficult to argue that Eusebius was ignorant of the potential parallels. For whatever reason, in extant work at least, he showed no regard for them.

Likewise, in various other cases patristic authors compare and contrast Jesus with these figures in terms of death, ascension, or deification, but not resurrection, despite resurrection stories being known. Tertullian, an author who surely cannot be accused of ignorance of Greco-Roman culture, focuses on Hercules for his parallels to Jesus’s death and deification (Nat. 2.10, 14). Conversely, when he mentions Romulus, he only mentions him as a counterfeit of Jesus’s ascension, and that Jesus has better testimony to the truth of his story (Apol. 21; Marc. 4.7.3). The missing element in the story of Hercules, which we have already seen was known long before Tertullian, was his resurrection to receive the immortalization that comes with deification. That Tertullian passes over this known story in silence suggests that he implicitly denied the possible parallel was worth addressing.

Arnobius compares to Jesus those who died ignominious deaths yet are still worshiped, such as Liber/Bacchus (or Dionysus), Asclepius, Hercules, Attis, and Romulus (Against the Nations 1.41). He also compares to Jesus those who were said to become gods after death, such as Hercules, Romulus, Asclepius, Liber/Bacchus, and Aeneas, but also without explicit reference to resurrection or other means of bodily immortalization (3.39). In the former case, Arnobius insists that the worship of Jesus is more reasonable than these cults. In the latter case, he explicitly notes differences of opinion on whether these figures should be divinized, and so highlights their difference from the worship of Jesus.

Arnobius is one of the best examples of why the lack of addressing the parallel amounts to an implicit denial rather than ignorance of the stories in question. Perhaps no early Christian author shows as much awareness in his writing of both Greco-Roman mythology and the Christian criticism of the same.⁴¹ Since the resurrection was one of many features about Jesus that marked him as unique (1.46), the fact that he did not address these other stories represents an implicit denial of their need to be addressed.

Lactantius, an adult gentile convert (Augustine, Doctr. chr. 2.40.61) and a court rhetor of Diocletian in Nicomedia, also mentions three of the most consistently referenced figures in this regard in his Divine Institutes. As part of his larger contrast of idolatry with worship of the true God in Book 1, he refers to many of the gods his fellow Latin-speakers worshiped. He critiques the worthiness of Hercules to be worshiped, and part of this critique is the fact that his story ends with his being burned up, which is to say that there is no resurrection after that (1.9). Similarly, when he references Asclepius, he only mentions his death (1.10), even though he was worshiped and we have seen the awareness of earlier Christian authors of a claimed resurrection for him. When he mentions the Dioscuri, he notes that they are said to live and die alternately, but that Homer simply said that both died (1.10; cf. Homer, Il. 3.229–244). At none of these potential points does Lactantius engage with the possible parallels, and it can hardly be because he did not know about them.⁴²

Athanasius comes the closest to an explicit denial of a true parallel. The only thing setting him apart from that category is that he does not mention the resurrection claims in the first place. As part of his declaration in On the Incarnation that the gods who had been worshiped previously are judged as mortals after Jesus’s resurrection (46), he mentions Asclepius, Heracles, and Dionysus—and only them—but not their claimed resurrections/immortalizations (49), even though we have seen how these three figures were linked with such an idea. They were each worshiped after their deaths for respects in which Jesus/the Word surpassed all of them, including that his story did not end at his death. In fact, immediately after the section referencing them, he insists that there are many contrasts of the gospel with the myths of the gods, including that:

The Greeks told all sorts of false tales, but they could never pretend that their idols rose again from death: indeed it never entered their heads that a body could exist again after death at all. And one would be particularly ready to listen to them on this point, because by these opinions they have exposed the weakness of their own idolatry, at the same time yielding to Christ the possibility [of bodily resurrection],⁴³ so that by that means He might be recognized by all as Son of God.⁴⁴

For Athanasius, as for others, Jesus’s resurrection is what set him apart from all others (15), at least until the day when God would bring to completion the work of making others like him by conforming them to his resurrection (8–10; 20–22; 27–30; 44). This is not because they were unaware of the potential parallels, but because they saw them as being of no account.

After all, many of their interlocutors did not think these potential parallel stories actually happened, but the Christians proclaimed that their story actually happened, and they could appeal to testimony even at the risk of death to that effect (as Athanasius notes in Inc. 27–28). More frequently (as also in the case of Origen and others noted in the other categories), the early Christians contrast Jesus’s worshipfulness with these other gods, and Jesus’s resurrection was crucial to this argument not only as a display of power to which others could attest, but as God’s vindication of the one who was crucified, that he was indeed sinless yet gave his life because of the sins of others. In these other stories, while resurrection was certainly a display of power as well, the action did not have such theological freight of vindication, but instead involved either divine favoritism or attempting to correct something wrong. In line with this point, perhaps one may also suggest that these authors saw no need to take account of these stories because they lacked the salvific effect of extending resurrection to everlasting life to others.

Conclusion

The awareness of other resurrection stories as potential parallels to Jesus’s resurrection is not a modern phenomenon. In fact, writers as early as the second century supply evidence that they were aware of these stories, which is unsurprising given how ensconced in many stories their world was. Even beginning in the second century, we have seen that there emerged three types of responses to the parallel stories. First, some writers mentioned the stories when their addressees/interlocutors did not and assumed their veracity only for the sake of the argument. Of course, the argument was only ever in service of showing the plausibility of the general eschatological resurrection. There is no record of this strategy being used in service of an argument in defense of Jesus’s resurrection. Second, some writers addressed stories, whether raised by the addressees (in Origen’s case) or not (in Justin’s case), in terms of explicitly denying parallels between Jesus and these other stories. Any apparent similarities come from the devil seeking to counterfeit, but more important were the differences, whereby one can see that Jesus’s resurrection is the true story of which these myths were counterfeits. Third, the most common response to the stories that presented potential parallels to Jesus was to write so as to deny equivalence of the stories implicitly. Except for Minucius Felix, who does not mention Jesus’s resurrection, every writer in this category implicitly denies parallels they otherwise surely or likely knew because they insisted on the uniqueness of Jesus’s resurrection. For the variety in responses, this was a conviction that all these writers shared. Only Jesus had actually been raised by God from the dead. Only Jesus was vindicated and exalted as the risen Lord worthy of worship. Only Jesus could save by virtue of his death because of the sins of others and his resurrection whereby he could communicate his everlasting life to others. Any possible analogies could not compare to this story.

1. Tryggve N. D. Mettinger, “The ‘Dying and Rising God’: A Survey of Research from Frazer to the Present Day,” in David and Zion: Biblical Studies in Honor of J. J. M. Roberts, ed. Bernardo F. Bato and Kathryn L. Roberts (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2004), 373–86; Mettinger, The Riddle of Resurrection: “Dying and Rising Gods” in the Ancient Near East, ConBOT 50 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2001), esp. 15–52. Like Mettinger, I think the category still has validity, but that it should be used in a more qualified fashion than previous generations of scholars have used it, and its significance is not dictated by the cycle of seasons/vegetation.

2. Richard W. Boynton, Beyond Mythology: A Challenge to Dogmatism in Religion (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1951), 161–64; Richard Carrier, On the Historicity of Jesus: Why We Might Have Reason for Doubt (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2014), esp. 36–48, 164–73, 387–506; Carrier, Jesus from Outer Space: What the Earliest Christians Really Believed About Christ (Durham, NC: Pitchstone, 2020), 111–51; T. W. Doane, Bible Myths and Their Parallels in Other Religions Being a Comparison of the Old and New Testament Myths and Miracles with Those of Heathen Nations of Antiquity Considering Also Their Origin and Meaning, 4th ed. (New York: Truth Seeker, 1882), 215–32; Kersey Graves, The World’s Sixteen Crucified Saviors: Or Christianity Before Christ, 3rd ed. (Boston: Colby and Rich, 1876), 128–34; Robert M. Price, “Brand X Easters,” in The Resurrection of Jesus: A Sourcebook, ed. Bernard Brandon Scott (Santa Rosa, CA: Polebridge, 2008), 49–59; Price, Jesus Is Dead (Cranford, NJ: American Atheist, 2007), 135–45, 209–10. More generally on supposed derivation of the NT from Greco-Roman and other myths of non-Jewish origin, see Tom Harpur, The Pagan Christ: Recovering the Lost Light (Toronto: Allen, 2004); Harpur, Water into Wine: An Empowering Vision of the Gospels (Toronto: Allen, 2007); Dennis R. MacDonald, Mythologizing Jesus: From Jewish Teacher to Epic Hero (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).

3. Roland G. Bonnel and Vincent A. Tobin, “Christ and Osiris: A Comparative Study,” in Pharaonic Egypt: The Bible and Christianity, ed. Sarah I. Goll (Jerusalem: Magness, 1985), 1–29; D. Gerald Bostock, “Osiris and the Resurrection of Christ,” ExpTim 112 (2001): 265–71; Herbert Braun, Jesus of Nazareth, the Man and His Time, trans. Everett R. Kalin (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1979), 14–15; Wilhelm Bousset, Kyrios Christos: A History of the Belief in Chrit from the Beginnings of Christianity to Irenaeus, trans. John E. Steely (Nashville: Abingdon, 1970), 56–60; Deborah M. Coulter-Harris, Chasing Immortality in World Religions (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2016), 103–11, esp. 104–5; Pinchas Lapide, The Resurrection of Jesus: A Jewish Perspective, trans. Wilhelm C. Linss (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1983), 41; M. David Litwa, How the Gospels Became History: Comparing Jesus and Mediterranean Myths (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2019). One should note that Litwa (How the Gospels, 22–45) carefully distinguishes his ideas from Jesus mythicists. Similar to Litwa, though not as much built on primary texts, is Evan Fales, “Taming the Tehom: The Sign of Jonah in Matthew,” in The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave, ed. Robert M. Price and Jeffrey Lay Lowder (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005), 307–48. Also see John W. Sweeley, Jesus in the Gospels: Man, Myth, or God, rev. ed. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000), 163–72. For others, it is less of a matter of there being a direct link of influence as that the stories are analogous. A prime example of this is Dag Øistein Endsjø, Greek Resurrection Beliefs and the Success of Christianity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 47–99.

4. J. R. R. Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” in The Monsters and the Critics and Other Essays, ed. Christopher Tolkien (London: HarperCollins, 2006), 125–29, 153–57. For a reconstruction of the conversation between Tolkien and Lewis, which also produced the former’s “Mythopoeia,” see Humphrey Carpenter, J. R. R. Tolkien: A Biography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 150–52. One can see Lewis take Tolkien’s ideas to heart in his essay “Myth Became Fact.” C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), 63–67.

5. C. J. Armstrong and Andrew R. DeLoach, “Myth and Resurrection,” in The Resurrection Fact: Responding to Modern Critics, John J. Bombaro and Adam S. Francisco (Irvine, CA: New Reformed, 2016), 177–206; Ross Clifford and Philip Johnson, The Cross Is Not Enough: Living as Witnesses to the Resurrection (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2012), 185–200; Leon McKenzie, Pagan Resurrection Myths and the Resurrection of Jesus: A Christian Perspective (Charlottesville, VA: Bookwrights, 1997). While Mary Jo Sharp (“Is the Story of Jesus Borrowed from Pagan Myths?” in In Defense of the Bible: A Comprehensive Apologetic for the Authority of Scripture, ed. Steven B. Cowan and Terry L. Wilder [Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2013], 183–200) presents more material on discontinuity of Jesus’s story with the myths, she nevertheless incorporates this strategy as well.

6. Keith Baker, “The Resurrection of Jesus in Its Graeco-Roman Setting,” RTR 62 (2003): 1–13, 97–105; Craig L. Blomberg, “A Positive Case for the Resurrection,” in Resurrection, Faith or Fact? A Scholars’ Debate Between a Skeptic and A Christian by Carl Stecher and Craig Blomberg, with contributions by Richard Carrier and Peter S. Williams (Durham, NC: Pitchstone, 2019), 127–30; Blomberg, “Summing It All Up,” in Resurrection, Faith or Fact? A Scholars’ Debate Between a Skeptic and A Christian by Carl Stecher and Craig Blomberg, with contributions by Richard Carrier and Peter S. Williams (Durham, NC: Pitchstone, 2019), 285–87; S. Ross Hickling, An Evidentiary Analysis of Doctor Richard Carrier’s Objections to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2018), 115–218; James Patrick Holding, ed., Shattering the Christ Myth: Did Jesus Not Exist? (Maitland, FL: Xulon, 2008), 205–88; Ronald H. Nash, The Gospel and the Greeks: Did the New Testament Borrow from Pagan Thought? 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R, 2003), 159–62; Nicholas Perrin, “On Raising Osiris in 1 Corinthians 15,” TynBul 58 (2007): 117–28; George C. Ring, “Christ’s Resurrection and the Dying and Rising Gods,” CBQ 6 (1944): 216–29; N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, vol. 3 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 80–81; Edwin M. Yamauchi, “Did Christians Copy Earlier Pagan Resurrection Stories?” in The Harvest Handbook of Apologetics, ed. Joseph M. Holden (Eugene, OR: Harvest House, 2018), 149–55.

7. E.g., Joachim Jeremias, New Testament Theology (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 304; Mettinger, Riddle, 220–21. For all of his comparisons of the Gospels to myths, Litwa (How the Gospels, 39–41) remains skeptical of this particular parallel put forward by Carrier. For broader responses to Carrier along similar lines and others, see Simon Gathercole, “The Historical and Human Existence of Jesus in Paul’s Letters,” JSHJ 16 (2018): 183–212; Daniel N. Gullotta, “On Richard Carrier’s Doubts: A Response to Richard Carrier’s On the Historicity of Jesus: Why We Might Have Reasons for Doubt,” JSHJ 15 (2017): 310–46. For an especially helpful survey of the primary texts, see John Granger Cook, Empty Tomb, Resurrection, Apotheosis, WUNT 410 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018), 56–321.

8. Cook, Empty Tomb, 142.

9. On the role of mythology, especially from the source of Homer, in Greco-Roman education before and during our timeframe of interest, as will be seen in the primary sources cited below, see Karl Olav Sandnes, The Challenge of Homer: School, Pagan Poets and Early Christianity, LNTS 400 (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 3–4, 19–20, 40–58, 84–243. More broadly, see Albert Henrichs, Greek Myth and Religion (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2019); Zahra Newby, Greek Myths in Roman Art and Culture: Imagery, Values and Identity in Italy, 50 BC–AD 250, Greek Culture in the Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

10. Robert M. Grant, “The Resurrection of the Body,” JR 28 (1948): 127. The earliest implied post-NT reference to this resurrection of the flesh in Christian discourse is the citation of a Greek translation of Job 19:26 that refers to the raising of “this flesh of mine” in 1 Clem. 26:3. The earliest explicit declaration comes from Ignatius, Smyrn. 3. Also see 2 Clem. 9:1–6; 14:3–5; Justin (?), Res.; Irenaeus, Haer. 1.22.1; 3.16.6; 4.33.2; 5.3.3; 5.7; 5.9–15; 5.31.2; 5.33.1; Tatian, Or. Graec. 15 (cf. 6; 25); Theophilus, Autol. 1.7. For formal confessions using this expression, see the Old Roman Creed, the Apostles’ Creed, the Creed of Jerusalem, the Creed of the First Council of Toledo, and Apos. Con. 7.41.

11. On the difficulty in defining what counts as “apologetic” literature, see D. H. Williams, Defending and Defining the Faith: An Introduction to Early Christian Apologetic Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 1–9, 21–36.

12. I should also clarify that by “resurrection,” I mean a return to bodily life after a period of death, usually with an implied upward movement for the body. When I say in cases below that something does not clearly constitute a resurrection, I mean that it does not clearly fit this definition or that references to a given action do not otherwise use the key terms for signifying resurrection. For more on key terms and contexts in which they are used for resurrection, see Cook, Empty Tomb, 7–49; K. R. Harriman, “Expectations and the Interpretation of Resurrection as ‘Bodily,’” JETS 65 (2022): 753–71 (esp. 758–64).

13. Athenaeus, Deipn. 9.392d–e (LCL 235:320–23) cites Eudoxus of Cnidus (fr. 284a), who wrote in the fourth century BCE, for this story about Heracles. Zenobius, writing in Rome in the early second century CE, also attests to this story in Epit. 5.56. Also note the reference to the “awakening” (ἔγερσις) of Heracles in Josephus, Ant. 8.145–146; Ag. Ap. 1.118–119 (cf. Matt 27:53). In general, see Cook, Empty Tomb, 124–32. By contrast, there is no clear extant literary attestation of Asclepius’s own resurrection prior to Theophilus. He was divinized and he did have resurrection deeds attributed to him, but his own resurrection appears to have been a later notion, perhaps to account for his divinization in combination with the story of Zeus striking him down (see Cook, Empty Tomb, 169).

14. There were multiple Dionysi at this time (Cicero, Nat. d. 3.23.58), but at least one non-Orphic Dionysus did have a resurrection story attached to him wherein he was revived after his dismemberment by the Titans. For more on this, see Cook, Resurrection, 132–40 (including references well before Theophilus). Plutarch, Is. Os. 35 identifies Osiris with Dionysus, including in their resurrections. On Osiris, see Plutarch, Is. Os. 13–19; Cook, Empty Tomb, 74–87. It should be noted that Osiris does undergo resurrection in the sense defined in n. 12, but his return to bodily life still leaves him confined to the netherworld so that he remains among the dead. In the case of Adonis, it is likely that Theophilus was aware of a resurrection story in his case, as the resurrection story does not seem to have been a predominate feature of his story, and a version of it resembles the story of Persephone spending part of the year in the underworld more than a proper resurrection (but see Lucian, Syr. d. 6). On Adonis, and particularly on Christian references to him, see Cook, Empty Tomb, 87–110. Even further away from a reference to resurrection is Attis, for whom there is no resurrection story in evidence before the third century CE (Cook, Empty Tomb, 110–24).

15. On Theophilus’s demonstrated knowledge of Hellenistic culture, see Robert M. Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1988), 148–55.

16. Translation from Epiphanius, Ancoratus, trans. Young Richard Kim, FC 128 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 181–82. Note that this directly contradicts Grant’s statement quoted earlier.

17. See Euripides, Alcestis. For more on the relevance of the story of Alcestis to early Christianity, though not as a source, see Christopher Bryan, The Resurrection of the Messiah (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 29–34.

18. On Pelops, see Hyginus, Fab. 83; Ovid, Metam. 6.401–411; Apollodorus, Epit. 2.3. I am not aware of any other source before Epiphanius that attests to this version of Amphiaraus’s story. Otherwise, while he was divinized, he was not resurrected because he had not died (see Cook, Empty Tomb, 338–40). On Glaucus, see Palaephetus, Incred. 26; Agatharchides, Mari Eryth. 1.7; Hyginus, Fab. 136; Apollodorus, Bibl. 3.3. On Castor and Pollux/the Dioscuri, see Pindar, Nem. 10.73–90; Hyginus, Fab. 80; 251. This is not a straightforward case of resurrection, but it is more an exceptional instance of immortalization that alternates, yet it certainly is still a bodily fate. On Protesilaus, see Agatharchides, Mari Eryth. 1.7; Hyginus, Fab. 103; 251; Apollodorus, Epit. 3.29–30; Aelius Aristides, Or. 3.365 (Cook, Empty Tomb, 174–76); Cook, Empty Tomb, 291–302. The reference to Protesilaus here is grammatically dependent on the one to Castor and Pollux so that they use the same verb (ἀναζωοποιέω) and Epiphanius appears to think of both in terms of temporarily being made alive again. But one should note, as Cook observes in the aforementioned review, that there are different notions of how Protesilaus temporarily returned from Hades, depending on the source.

19. For a full translation of this work, see Sebastian Gertz, John Dillon, and Donald Russell, trans., Aeneas of Gaza: Theophrastus, with Zacharias of Mytilene: Ammonius (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012).

20. The verb ἀνίστημι only appears in the first case and is gapped/assumed in the subsequent clauses. For these stories, beyond those already noted, see Euripides, Alc. 112–130; Xenophon, Cyn. 1.6; Philodemus, Piet. 131; Ovid, Fast. 6.743–762; Apollodorus, Bibl. 2.5.12; 3.10.3; Pausanias, Descr. 2.27.4; Lucian, Salt. 45; Sextus Empiricus, Math. 7.260–262; Cook, Empty Tomb, 183–84.

21. On Aristeas, see Herodotus 4.14–15; Apollonius Paradoxographus, Mir. 2; Plutarch, Rom. 28.4. It is unclear where the story could have been found in Pindar, but it is not in his extant works.

22. Endsjø, Greek Resurrection Beliefs, 54–64; Dag Øistein Endsjø, “Immortal Bodies, Before Christ: Bodily Continuity in Ancient Greece and 1 Corinthians,” JSNT 30 (2008): 417–36 (esp. 433–34).

23. Caroline Walker Bynum (The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336 [New York: Columbia University Press, 1995]) notes responses to the chain of consumption (when various animals or even other humans consume human bodies and other consume those who consumed human bodies) throughout her work. For more on responses to this and other philosophical problems, see Jeff Green, “Resurrection,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, https://www.iep.utm.edu/resurrec/.

24. On Justin’s Hellenistic background, see Grant, Greek Apologists, 50–52.

25. See sources in n. 20.

26. On Celsus in early Christianity, see Grant, Greek Apologists, 133–39.

27. As Williams (Defending, 274–75) notes, this is part of Celsus’s argument undermining Christians linking themselves to Jewish roots in order to claim antiquity, which was a common and crucial apologetic strategy.

28. We have already noted the last three stories elsewhere (one should note that the case of Heracles referenced here is not his resurrection story noted in Theophilus, but his return from Hades after defeating Cerberus). On Zamolxis (also spelled Zalmoxis), see Herodotus 4.94–96. As for the reference to Pythagoras, the history of this purported story is hazy, and some have supposed that the story of Zamolxis, a disciple of Pythagoras, has been transferred to Pythagoras, but there are also ancient authors, generally polemical against Pythagoras, who indicate something similar was attributed as happening to him. On this issue, see Walter Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, trans. Edwin L. Minar, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 155–62. On Rhampsinitus, see Herodotus 2.122. On Orpheus, see Ovid, Metam. 10.1–85.

29. For more on Origen’s versatility in responding to Celsus, see Robert Somos, “The Strategy of Argumentation of Origen’s Contra Celsum,” Adamantius 18 (2012): 200–217.

30. Like Aeneas, indeed, probably as Aeneas’s source, Origen also writes of references in Pindar and Herodotus. However, he only quotes from Herodotus.

31. On the background and dating of this source, see Grant, Greek Apologists, 36–39, 45.

32. As Cook (Empty Tomb, 102–4) notes, this was an identification that appears more often in Christian sources than non-Christian ones. On the story of Tammuz in the Descent of Inanna, which resembles the story of Persephone more than a proper resurrection, see Cook, Empty Tomb, 69–73.

33. On resurrection in Egypt, including how Osiris is related, see Jan Assmann, Death and Salvation in Ancient Egypt, trans. David Lorton (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 2005); Assmann, “Resurrection in Ancient Egypt,” in Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments, ed. Ted Peters, Robert John Russell, and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2002), 124–35.

34. Justin’s disciple Tatian also focused on counterfeit ascensions of figures like Antoninus as a point of argument (Or. Graec. 10). Like Theophilus (as well as others), Tatian also argues for resurrection based on the operations of creation in response to Stoic philosophers (5–6). This is also the direction Justin takes in his On Resurrection (if indeed the work is by Justin), wherein he responds to philosophers, rather than any parallel stories of resurrection. On Tatian, see Grant, Greek Apologists, 112–32. For more on resurrection arguments and how they relate to the popular sciences and philosophies of the day (for all my disagreements with his views on the biblical texts), see Grant, “The Resurrection of the Body [continued],” JR 28 (1948): 188–208.

35. On the date, see Williams, Defending, 242–43.

36. Cf. Endsjø, “Immortal Bodies,” 429.

37. On Romulus’s fate, see Ovid, Met. 14.818–828; Plutarch, Pel. 16.5; Rom. 27.3–28.8; Cook, Empty Tomb, 254–72.

38. Williams (Defending, 245) suggests, “Could it be that to attract the pagan, our author aims to present Christianity through pagan eyes, as it were, in a form which an educated pagan would readily comprehend? The timing is right to produce such an argumentation. It is a highly polished production, freely employing the learning of ancient literature, building on the work of the ancient philosophers to represent the Christian faith as the true philosophy on which to form one’s life.”

39. Minucius was a former pagan by his own admission (1).

40. Macrobius, Sat. 1.18–21 follows a similar tactic in connecting Liber/Bacchus, Asclepius, Heracles, Serapis, Adonis, Attis, Osiris, and the Dioscuri with the sun.

41. Indeed, he shows a remarkable contrast between his knowledge of pagan sources and his knowledge of his own group of Christians. According to Williams (Defending, 293), “From start to finish, it is plain that Arnobius does not have competency in Christian theology or Biblical exegesis. His expressions and vocabulary regarding Christian content is therefore minimalist and sometimes questionable. It is not accurate to accuse him of unorthodoxy, as much as of an unformed orthodoxy.”

42. On how Lactantius contrasts with Arnobius in his demonstrated knowledge of Christian sources, see Williams, Defending, 316–17.

43. This phrase is not in the Greek but is provided by the translator for clarification.

44. Athanasius, Inc. 50 (St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation, trans. Penelope Lawson [Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1998], 89).