The Resurrection Body in 1 Cor 15:42–49

(avg. read time: 23–46 mins.)

This is one of two extracts of my dissertation I will be sharing this week. This first one concerns the resurrection body and the new creation in 1 Cor 15:42–49. This text represents a more direct return to the subject of resurrection after Paul’s preparation in vv. 36–41, as Paul signals with the opening of οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν (“Thus also is the resurrection of the dead”). This opening establishes an inferential correspondence between God’s creative decrees and the resurrection, which shows its dependence on the argument immediately preceding in vv. 36–41. Furthermore, this segment represents, in some ways, a reprise of Paul’s argument in vv. 20–28.

N. T. Wright has noted that this segment is rhetorically parallel to vv. 20–28 and I have found at least seven connections to demonstrate this point.¹ First, both segments open with ideas utilizing agricultural imagery in relation to the resurrection (vv. 20, 23, 42b–44a). Second, both segments provide parallel Adam-Christ contrasts linking the former to the mortality of the present age and the latter to the resurrection life of the age to come (vv. 20–23, 45–49). Third, both segments connect Jesus’s resurrection and the believers’ resurrection in such a way that the former is the basis for the latter (vv. 20–23, 48–49). Fourth, both segments feature the use of ζῳοποιέω—a verb often linked to resurrection when it does appear—in reference to Christ (vv. 22b, 45b), albeit this segment uses the verb actively to make a more direct statement about Christ’s action. Fifth, Paul emphasizes proper sequential order in both segments, albeit the order of Christ and the believers on one hand and the order of the “soul-possessed” and “Spirit-possessed” on the other (vv. 23, 46). Sixth, Paul uses the “image” concept for the believer in parallel with the “rulership” concept he had utilized earlier in reference to Jesus as the true human (vv. 24–25, 28, 49; cf. Gen 1:26–27; Pss 8:6; 110:1). Seventh, the segments are built around parallel eschatological concepts of kingdom and new creation, both of which are cosmic in scope (vv. 24–28, 45–49).

The parallels of these two segments also illustrate the parallel hopes of the kingdom of God and new creation as expressions of the foundation of resurrection belief in God’s inexorable, faithful love. It thus also continues the interlocking of this foundation with the foundation that resurrection is necessary to the realization of God’s cosmic-scale promises of the new creation and the kingdom of God. However, the former foundation is more muted in vv. 42–49, as it is present only indirectly through the passive uses of the resurrection verb (as v. 15 has identified God as the active agent) and the implications of the contrasts that I note below, which begin with v. 42b.

The Resurrection Body

Verse 42b begins a structure of antithetical pairs that guides the rest of the text through v. 50 and will reemerge in vv. 53–54. In vv. 42b–44a, the antithetical pairs consist of both verbs and substantives, while the rest of the contrasts consist only of substantives. But what is interesting in the set of contrasts in vv. 42b–44a is that there is no clear noun to serve as the subject until v. 44a, where Paul references the “body.” Translators thus take this noun as the subject of the preceding and thus insert “it” as the subject of verbs throughout. Consistently with this reading, most early interpreters saw here a consistency of subject and thus emphasized the continuity of identity in the body, rather than thinking the subject shifts back and forth for no apparent reason, even if some saw Paul’s stress being on the change the selfsame body experienced.²

Three points justify this move by the translators. First, the preceding context clarifies that the teaching here is about bodies, both in the immediate context of vv. 40–41 and in the opening of this section in v. 35, where the raising of the dead and the concern about their bodies are placed side-by-side.³ In case there were any lingering doubts about the culturally assumed nature of resurrection language, Paul’s parallel questions here make clear that asking about how the dead are raised is of one piece with asking about their bodies. Andrew W. Pitts astutely observes:

So when Paul says in 15:42 οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν he is recoding the paragraph level theme of the bodies of the dead, already introduced in 1 Cor 15:35. And in 15:42–44, each clause complex forms a grammatical parallel with a predicator (P) and a prepositional adjunct (A) through exact lexical repetitions in the predictor slots for which the verbs do encode the subject (S) in their morphology (i.e., the “it” is implied in the verbal form).⁴

As such, Paul has created an expectation in his audience that he will be talking about the resurrection body and its relation to the present body and v. 44 functions as the ultimate clarification that this subject is exactly what he is discussing in this segment.

Second, if v. 44 makes clear that the subject of the verbs is the body, it also makes clear that the subject of each of the preceding antithetical pairs of clauses is one consistent subject. Even as Paul has recoded the theme of v. 35 in v. 42, so too has he made explicit the parallel concern with bodies in v. 44, so that the frame of this tightly structured section clearly shows that Paul addresses what happens to the dead who rise again, not to the dead who somehow live without bodies or to new subjects that replace the dead every time the resurrection verb is used.⁵ The syntax also most likely rules out the idea that Paul is referring to utterly distinct bodies, as James P. Ware argues:

Within the conventions of ancient Greek syntax, consecutive verbs, apart from the introduction of a new subject, are understood to have the same subject as the verb preceding (e.g., Matt 6:26; 16:21; Mark 4:32; 1 Cor 13:5-7; 15:3–4). If a change of subject between consecutive verbs occurs, this must normally (for obvious reasons of clarity) be expressed (e.g., Matt 11:5; 13:4–8; 24:40–41; Mark 12:32; Luke 1:11–13; 12:24; Rom 14:4–6). Distinct subjects for the verbs in 15:42-44 would thus require a construction such as μέν σπείρεται ... αλλο εγείρεται (“one [body] is sown ... another [body] is raised”). An exception to this rule occurs when the object of a previous verb, or a noun or pronoun within its clause, is taken up as the subject of the verb that follows (e.g., Mark 9:27; Luke 8:29; John 19:31). However, this syntactic feature is not present in the passage under consideration.⁶

More significantly, such a reading would require a subject change without a potential marker aside from the verbs a total of seven times after the introduction of the initial subject in v. 42b. That is seven unmarked times in the space of twenty-four words, a schizoid syntax otherwise unheard of in ancient Greek, at least as far as Ware or I know. By contrast, when Paul expressly addresses distinct subjects in vv. 45–47, he clearly marks different subjects with different substantives, rather than different verbs. And in the rhetorically parallel segment of vv. 20–28, Paul used a combination of distinct substantives and distinct verbs in vv. 21–22 to signify different subjects.

Third, to extend the previous point, Paul introduces these two descriptions of the body in v. 44 to serve as a transition to his Adam-Christ contrast in vv. 45–48 in order to set up his point in v. 49, which draws the entire segment together, that the dead who once wore the image of the earthly/dusty man will wear the image of the heavenly man in the resurrection. The consistent subjects here, encoded in the two first-person plural verbs, wear both images in a distinct sequence. The intervening contrasts of vv. 45–48 use different terminology to extend the same contrasts of vv. 42b–44, which indicates that the terminology in the first clause of v. 49 is parallel with the negative side of the antitheses, while the terminology in the second clause is parallel with the positive side of the antitheses. Through these interconnections, Paul shows his expectation of a consistent subject of the verbs, such that those who were previously sown in Adam’s image—the parallelism once again supports the anthropogenic reading rather than the burial reading of the sowing imagery—will arise in Christ’s image.

The contrasts of vv. 42b–44a thus apply to bodies, but one should also note that they apply to the ages those bodies inhabit. Although the material of the bodies per se may not be the focus of these contrasts, this connection between the body and the age that body inhabits makes sense in light of the body’s shared history with the rest of creation. It is worth considering some ways in which these contrasts are microcosmically and macrocosmically applicable.

The first term, φθορά, generally refers to destruction, ruin, corruption, decay, and so on. It is sometimes a synonym for mortality in that it relates to destructibility, corruptibility, and the decay that comes with mortality and death itself (e.g., Plato, Phil. 55a; Resp. 546a; Aristotle, Phys. 229b.13; Thucydides 2.47.3; Sophocles, Ant. 1224). It can also serve metonymically for what leads to death (i.e., corruption), hence its use in some moral contexts. Paul applies it to the flesh (subject as it is to the power of sin) and its way of life in Gal 6:8, and it generally refers to what is transitory or temporary (by virtue of being part of the old age) in Col 2:22. Outside of Paul, 2 Pet 2:12, 19 use it in reference to being bound to the perishability of the world, an especially poignant statement in this context given the reference to the world’s conflagration in 3:10. In 1 Cor 15, it serves well as a description for the mortality and destructibility of the body of the present age in subjection to the associated forces of sin, death, and decay. It describes what destroys and robs of life by virtue of creating alienation from the God who gives life.⁷

The second term in the contrast, ἀφθαρσία, is the negation of the first, as signified by the alpha privative, but I have translated it positively as “absolute vivification.” It generally refers to indestructibility, immunity to decay, incorruptibility (in both vital and moral senses), and it can function as a synonym for immortality/ἀθανασία, as in vv. 53–54 (cf. Aristotle, Top. 6 [145b.22–34]). Paul uses the term in Rom 2:7 for what the righteous seek, the result of which is that God gives them everlasting life. It is also part of a prepositional phrase that characterizes the proper love for Christ in Eph 6:24 and it is a benefit of the gospel in 2 Tim 1:10. Outside of the NT and patristic literature, it may be applied to God or the gods, or it may otherwise be an allusion to the divine (e.g., Philo, Heir 35; Names 210; Moses 2.194; Eternity 46–47; Plutarch, Arist. 6.3; Diogenes Laertius, Lives 10.76, 123). Indeed, Philo sometimes uses it as a synonym for “divine” (Philo, Creation 153; Sacrifices 5). Wisdom 2:23 reflects a similar idea in saying that humans were originally supposed to have this quality in order to reflect God and that this quality is restored through following Wisdom in 6:18–19 (cf. Philo, Agriculture 100; Drunkenness 140; 212; Flight 59; Dreams 1.217–218; 2.258). Patristic literature used this term as a reference to the character of divine life, which Jesus made accessible to humans through his union of God and human in his incarnation (which was brought to completion in his death and resurrection; e.g., Irenaeus, Haer. 3.18.7; 19.1; Athanasius, Inc. 8; 22; John of Damascus, Orthodox Faith 3.12).⁸

The associated adjectives of φθαρτός and ἄφθαρτος appear together in contrasts in vv. 52–54; Rom 1:23 (contrasting God with creatures of the world made into idols); 1 Cor 9:25 (contrasting temporary reward with reward from God); and 1 Pet 1:18, 23 (contrasting the things of the world with the things of God). The latter adjective also applies to God in 1 Tim 1:17, a parallel statement to the declaration that only God is immortal in 1 Tim 6:16. It also refers a heavenly/divine inheritance in 1 Pet 1:4, as well as, arguably, a divine quality of gentleness exemplified in humans in 3:4.⁹

More broadly in the realm of associated terminology, Dag Øistein Endsjø observes:

As immortality was the continuous union of body and soul, to become immortal was literally a question of the flesh becoming incorruptible, to have one’s body being given that same perfect physical nature as Zeus, Hera and Athena. Gods were, as we also have seen, repeatedly referred to as incorruptible, aphthitos. As the eternal bane of human nature, corruptibility is the process that forever breaks down the human body. Only through becoming incorruptible could the flesh ascertain that the body would forever remain together with the soul. The very flesh would be transformed so that it no longer could fall victim to the ravage of time and decay.¹⁰

There was thus extensive precedent in Paul’s world for associating this quality with divinity and bodies with divine qualities. However, Paul does not assign this quality to God’s own body, as in Greek literature, but to the body that God gives. He also does not look to the distant mythological past for this kind of body, but to the recent epoch-making past of the Christ-event/gospel story and to the eschatological future.

In light of the uses elsewhere in connection with God and the eschatological context here, it seems best to translate ἀφθαρσία in a more positive sense than the negative sense that the alpha privative warrants. It refers not simply to the absence of death or mortality, but to the banishment of these qualities that is the result of receiving the utter fullness of everlasting life, the type of life untouchable by death or mortality. The absolute vivification that comes with resurrection to everlasting life removes all symptoms of mortality and replaces them with the characteristics of the everlasting life of God.

Paul also uses the two terms of v. 42b to describe cosmic conditions (v. 50 [in parallelism with “kingdom of God”]; Rom 8:21; cf. 2 Pet 1:4). Bodies of the present age experience in themselves and in the world around them the characteristic principle of decay, while bodies of the new age will experience decay’s reversal in complete vivification.¹¹ Indeed, Paul says that humans must be transformed in order to participate in the new creation characterized by this complete vivification (ἀφθαρσία, vv. 53–54). Interestingly, Philo also applies ἀφθαρσία on a cosmic level to the present world (Eternity, esp. 32–38) and rejects the idea that there will be a new creation (Eternity 39–51; cf. Aristotle, Cael. 1.10 [279b], 12 [281b–282a]). Because Paul’s worldview is in many ways starkly different from Philo, including in terms of his resurrection belief and overall eschatology, Paul assigns such a quality to the age to come, rather than the present age. As the body shares the characteristics of the present age, so too will it share the characteristics of the new creation.

The second antithesis of ἀτιμία and δόξα likewise derives from a contrast of the ages. The first term refers to dishonor, disgrace, disdain, humiliation, shame, or the deprivation of various marks of honor. This description befits humans under the domination of sin, living in denial of their proper function and glory as image-bearers of God. It is also a parallel with the term ταπείνωσις, which Paul uses only once in Phil 3:21, another text in which he references glory in the context of bodies and resurrection (cf. Rom 8:21).

The Philippians parallel is also important in how it exemplifies Paul’s portrayal of believers as being transformed by being conformed to the image of Christ, sharing in his glory, and thus God’s glory, which is also illustrated in this chapter (v. 49; cf. Rom 8:29; 2 Cor 3:18). Perhaps precisely because of the term’s association with God, Paul never provides straightforward explanation of what he means by δόξα in his letters, even as he associates it with its typical conceptual constellation of radiance, splendor, honor, praise(worthiness), dignity, magnificence, and majesty. In my analysis in my dissertation of vv. 35–41, I have noted the term’s connection to proper dignity and proper function, and it is crucial to note that “proper” here is defined by the will of God. Perhaps the best simple description of the more theologically driven sense of “glory,” when applied to creatures, is that it is that capacity in which creatures reflect God insofar as they fulfill God’s will for them. Such an understanding is especially applicable to humans in that their “glory” is attached to their capacity to bear the image and likeness of God in representing him, particularly by virtue of their union with Christ (Rom 3:23; 6:4; 8:17–30; 9:4, 23; 1 Cor 2:7; 11:7; 2 Cor 3:7–11, 18; 4:17; Eph 3:16; Col 3:4).¹² This is why, for example, Rom 8 so closely ties sonship and glorification, as Preston Sprinkle argues:

In fact, glorification is in some sense the future visible manifestation of the believers’ presently inward status as “sons of God”. Their corrupted state and the suffering that follows might call this status into question. Therefore, their glorification will be the outward manifestation of this status. When their status is both internally and externally confirmed, then God will have completed his goal of redemption: to spiritually and physically renew his ‘sons’ in order that He might enjoyed [sic.] unhindered fellowship with them.¹³

This quality associated with resurrection and image-bearing is thus crucial to the realization of God’s creative purposes for humanity, even though it also signifies a state in which believers go beyond the original creation, as the new creation surpasses—and not merely repristinates—the old/present creation.

This contrast of ἀτιμία and δόξα is not as obviously cosmological in scope as the previous one. But the metaleptic effect of Paul’s earlier use Ps 8 in both the preceding vv. 39–41 and the rhetorically parallel vv. 26–28 affects how one should read the reference to “glory” in v. 43. As “glory” in this context references the proper place and function of humans and other bodies in creation, the contrast of “humiliation” references the current dysfunctional condition of creation in which humans—and by extension, the rest of creation—have surrendered their proper glory for something lesser.¹⁴ Although the terms of the contrasts are not identical, the use of “glory” in reference to resurrection and new creation in Rom 8:18, 21 illustrates how the human reception of “glory,” as image-bearers of God, is essential for both their redemption and the redemption of the whole creation.

The third contrast of ἀσθένεια and δύναμις focuses on weakness versus power. As the former term can also refer to “illness” or “infirmity,” it summarizes well the state of the present body as susceptible to all kinds of weakness and to various forces that lead to death. The latter term in Paul is frequently a divine attribute (Rom 1:4, 16, 20; 9:17; 15:13, 19; 1 Cor 1:18, 24; 2:4–5; 5:4; 6:14; 2 Cor 4:7; 6:7; 12:9–12; 13:4; Gal 3:5; Eph 1:19–20; 3:7, 16, 20; Phil 3:10; Col 1:11, 29; 1 Thess 1:5; 2 Thess 1:11; 2 Tim 1:7–8), much like glory and absolute vivification. As the resurrected will share God’s life and God’s glory, they will also share in God’s power that raises them and invigorates them forever. In all these various ways, the negative sides of the contrasts imply alienation from God as what afflicts the present age, whereas the positive sides of the contrasts imply union with God as what characterizes the age to come. Paul thus shows his interlocking of the foundation of God’s inexorable, faithful love (here expressed in his communication of himself in giving resurrection life) and the foundation of the promises of kingdom and new creation.

To that point, this third contrast also has cosmological significance. The use of the latter term elsewhere in 1 Corinthians refers to a quality of the kingdom of God (4:20; 12:10, 28–29; 14:11) or as a reference to God’s resurrecting power (6:14; cf. 2 Cor 13:4; Eph 1:19–20; Phil 3:10). This point once again signifies how resurrection and the new creation are of one piece. Conversely, the former term serves adequately as a term summarizing the state of the present age from a slightly different angle than the two aforementioned negative conditions, as well as a contrast to expectations of the kingdom.

The σῶμα πνευματικόν

This leads to the final and most controversial contrast in v. 44 between the σῶμα ψυχικόν and the σῶμα πνευματικόν. But in order to address this controversy most adequately, this analysis must peek ahead to vv. 45–49, as v. 44 provides the terminology that will bridge this set of contrasts with the following set of contrasts. This circuitous route will also show how the foundation of Christ’s own resurrection and the foundation of incorporative, identifying, and participatory union with Christ illuminate the sense of both these terms, even as the foundations illuminated the earlier Adam-Christ contrast (and as they illuminated the argument of vv. 12–19, as I have observed elsewhere).

Paul implies the influence of the first foundation through the transition of v. 44b and the continuation of the theme in vv. 45–49. The terminology and parallels between vv. 42b–44a and vv. 44b–49 show that Paul’s description of the resurrection state in vv. 42b–44a derives from the resurrection body of Jesus like his description of the present state derives from the body of Adam. The different progenitors of Adam and Christ define what it means to be ψυχικός and πνευματικός respectively (vv. 44, 46), as well as χοϊκός and ἐπουράνιος respectively (vv. 48–49). While humans of the present age bear the life-receiving Adam’s image by virtue of their birth (v. 49a), like Seth before them (cf. Gen 5:3), believers will bear the image of the life-giving Christ by virtue of their resurrection (v. 49b), whereby they are made alive by Christ and become conformed to the image of Christ by becoming conformed to his resurrection (cf. Rom 8:29–30; Phil 3:20–21). The statement in v. 45 that Christ is the life-giving Spirit clarifies that Christ is not only the pattern/prototype for resurrection life, but also its proximate cause who makes the resurrection body like his own, being fully vivified, glorious, powerful, and, in ways that will be clarified below, belonging to the Spirit (vv. 42–44a).¹⁵ In such a sense, he is the ultimate agent of the God who raises the dead (identified as the active subject of resurrection action earlier in this chapter).

As argued before, Paul makes his link between Jesus’s resurrection and Christian resurrection on the basis of his belief in the foundation of union with Christ, which Christians have by virtue of the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit.¹⁶ The Spirit is the essential link of continuity between the present reality and the future hope, but the Spirit also guarantees the transformation of the resurrection body, as implied in the description of the σῶμα πνευματικόν.¹⁷ Indeed, the only other reference to resurrection in 1 Corinthians (6:14) is linked to Paul’s statement of how the body is the temple of the Holy Spirit (6:19), which conveys not only the strong interest the Spirit has in making the body what it is and will be, but also that the Spirit is the direct link of union between Christians and Christ.¹⁸

Paul articulates this union further in vv. 45–49 through his description of Jesus as life-giving Spirit, which is an expansion on his earlier point of contrasting Christ and Adam in vv. 20–23. While the Gen 2:7 text he uses here originally signaled the beginning of the story of humanity, its function in 1 Cor 15:45 and 47 is to serve as the first half of a contrast with the last progenitor, who begins the story of the new humanity and the new creation. Unlike the first life-receiving ψυχή Adam, this last Adam is life-giving (ζῳοποιοῦν, a term I have noted previously as connected to resurrection or resurrection imagery) and πνεῦμα. Since it is unlikely that Paul would refer to a human spirit as “life-giving,” the “spirit” in question is likely the Spirit of God and Christ (cf. Rom 8:2, 9–11; 2 Cor 3:6; Gal 6:8). Furthermore, James D. G. Dunn notes, “the Spirit of God is the obvious manifestation of the life-giving power of God. And although zoopoieo as such is not used of the Spirit in Jewish scriptures, an association between ‘(God’s) Spirit’ and ‘life’ was bound up with the word itself, since Hebrew ruach, like Greek pneuma, denotes also ‘breath,’ the breath of life.”¹⁹ Such a link is evident from the Genesis text Paul uses here, as well as Job 33:4; Ps 104:29–30; and especially Ezek 37:9–10, a passage also connected with resurrection imagery.²⁰

The early church would likewise give the Spirit a prominent role in articulations of resurrection belief. One early post-NT example is the Martyrdom of Polycarp, wherein Polycarp declares his hope that he might be conformed, like the other martyrs, to Christ and might receive resurrection to everlasting life in the “incorruptibility [or absolute vivification] of the Holy Spirit” (14.2). Likewise, Irenaeus refers to the resurrection body as possessed by the Spirit and having the qualities of the Spirit (Haer. 5.9.3). With texts like 1 Cor 15:45 in mind, the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed refers to the Spirit as the giver of life.

In this case, this intertwinement of Christ and the Spirit to describe Christ as “life-giving Spirit” in contrast to the living being who was the first Adam is not an easily derivable typological conclusion, but is more likely based on Paul’s and the Corinthians’ experience of spiritual relationship with Christ as the life-giving Spirit, a type of relationship Christ initiated consequent to his resurrection.²¹ Mehrdad Fatehi notes that there is an ontological link between the Spirit and Christ so that Christ truly is present through the Spirit, but is not reducible to the Spirit:

This would mean that the Spirit, when viewed in its capacity as the Spirit of Christ, does not refer to the risen Lord as he is in himself, but as he communicates his power, his life, his will, his very presence, to his people. So even where Paul comes closest to speak of the Spirit in referring to Christ’s own resurrection life and power, he turns out to be speaking of his communicating that life and power to his people (Rom. 1:3–4; 1 Cor. 15:45; cf. 2 Cor. 13:3–4).²²

Dunn similarly notes that from the perspective of revelation to humans, the Spirit has become identifiable by his relation to Christ:

The Spirit’s presence is indicated by the cry “Abba! Father!” in distinctive echo of Jesus’ prayer and indicative of a sharing in his sonship (Rom. 8.14-17). The Spirit’s inspiration is marked by the confession “Jesus is Lord” (1 Cor. 12.3). The work of the Spirit is to transform Christians into the divine likeness (2 Cor. 3.18), which is Christ (4.4). Hence also the Spirit is now known as “the Spirit of Christ” (Rom. 8.9), “the Spirit of [God’s] Son” (Gal. 4.6), “the Spirit of Jesus Christ” (Phil. 1.19) [cf. Acts 16:7; 1 Pet 1:11].²³

Paul’s close identification of Christ and the Spirit in the same text as he describes Christ as the Last Adam thus presents Christ on both sides of the God-human relationship. He is on the human side by virtue of being the Last Adam, the new progenitor of humanity, and the prototype of the new creation. He is on the side of God by virtue of communicating divine qualities and life to those in union with him, being Lord, being worthy of worship with God, and being identified with the life-giving Spirit (or as the source of life, as in Rom 5:17; 8:1–11; 2 Cor 4:8–10).²⁴

Furthermore, as Dunn summarizes, “in between he is God’s Son, whose sonship is shared with those who believe in him, the elder brother of a new family, firstborn from the dead. Yet he is also Son of God in power. And he is Lord, whose lordship both completes the intended dominion of Adam and exercises divine prerogatives.”²⁵ One sees a similar overlap here in his function as Last Adam. While Adam is the progenitor of humanity by virtue of being the first man, Christ is the new progenitor of humanity by virtue of his resurrection and communication of resurrection life to others. Thus, vv. 22 and 45 use the same verb to indicate that Christ’s own resurrection is the basis of the believers’ (cf. vv. 13–16, 20).

Each kind of progeny also receives a body apposite to the progenitor, meaning that believers will wear the image of the resurrected one when they receive bodies of a πνευματικός nature like the last Adam’s.²⁶ When they are raised as bodies belonging to the Spirit, the Spirit of Christ will animate their bodies by virtue of their spiritual generative union with Christ (cf. 1 Cor 6:12–20). Indeed, Paul’s use of the term πνευματικός as a modifier of the body signifies its nature as being somehow derived from the Spirit.

The most basic meaning of the -ικος suffix is to signify a relationship of “belonging to” or (per BDAG and EDNT) “pertaining to” the root.²⁷ The –ινος suffix is similar (cf. 1 Cor 3:1, 3), but where there is a distinction, as it is not always obvious there is one, it is that this suffix generally indicates a relationship of material/composition, while the -ικος suffix generally indicates an ethical, functional, or dynamic relationship of characteristic.²⁸ Many scholars thus understand the term as referring to what governs or animates the σῶμα, which also fits with the contrasting adjective of ψυχικόν.²⁹ In summary, one can define the range of meaning for πνευματικός that is relevant to the NT as, “pertaining or belonging to wind, air, breath, or spirit/Spirit in character/nature, particularly by motivation or dynamic action, often ethically or functionally.”³⁰ As noted already, the context indicates more specifically that the body pertains to the Spirit, rather than the other possibilities. Conversely, ψυχικός could be defined as, “pertaining or belonging to the present and mortal animating life-force” (often translated as “soul”).

Such an understanding fits with Paul’s other uses of these terms (outside of this letter, see Rom 1:11; 7:14; 15:27; Gal 6:1; Eph 1:3; 5:19; Col 1:9; 3:16). They appear most frequently in this letter. In 2:13 Paul refers to both spiritual things and the spiritual means by which he sought to explain them, which rather clearly in context pertain to the Spirit (2:4–5, 10–13) and close relationship to the same as the one who is guide/director (cf. 14:37). Paul further characterizes the spiritual in 2:14 by noting that the person who is ψυχικός does not understand the things pertaining to the Spirit because they must be spiritually discerned (i.e., the person must have a capacity and insight granted by the Spirit). Paul extends this same point in 2:15, but this time returning to the adjectival version of what he stated in adverbial form.³¹ After establishing these points, Paul turns the contrast into a charge against at least some of the Corinthians, because Paul cannot speak to them as “spiritual” people, since they are rather “fleshly” (σαρκινοί and σαρκικοί in 3:1 and 3, used here as synonyms for ψυχικός). Paul makes the same contrast in 9:11 that he made in Rom 15:27 concerning the spiritual “seed” (the gospel and teachings both belonging and pertaining to the Spirit) already sown and the expectation of reaping benefits pertaining to the flesh (σαρκικός; i.e., material things). When Paul refers to the story of the wilderness wandering, he describes the Israelites as eating spiritual food (10:3), drinking spiritual drink (10:4), and receiving that drink from the spiritual rock (10:4) who was/is Christ. These things were of spiritual nature/character because of their provision of spiritual sustenance and their transcendence of their visible forms. In the next section of his letter, Paul uses the adjective in a substantive fashion to refer to spiritual gifts, gifts that belong to the Spirit and given by the Spirit to the community characterized by the Spirit’s presence (12:1; 14:1).

Some scholars—most notably, Dale Martin and Troels Engberg-Pedersen—have claimed that this modifier defines the composition of the body as “spiritual” in nature.³² They defend their claim by pointing to Paul’s apparent concern with bodily composition in the immediate context (vv. 39, 47–50) and by observing that πνεῦμα was a material substance in Greek philosophical thought.³³ Thus, the σῶμα πνευματικόν is a body of ethereal substance, the substance that comprises the stars and the animating force. In fact, Engberg-Pedersen has stated that “only one answer is possible” as to why Paul describes this body as “pneumatic”: “Paul is also presupposing the specifically Stoic idea that the heavenly bodies that are situated at the top of the hierarchical scala naturae are distinctly made up of pneuma, as we saw in the texts from Cicero.”³⁴ He likewise connects the transformation imagined here to the Stoic conflagration in which all that is not πνεῦμα is transformed into πνεῦμα by the fire.³⁵

The lexical evidence and the contrasts within this segment suggest that the adjective describes the character of the body in terms of its animation, governing force, and even its fitness for the age to come (which is further implied by the parallel terms in vv. 42–43). Otherwise, the earlier text might have had more focus on the differences in the bodies rather than applying the basic descriptor to diverse bodies and the later text might have contrasted dust with a heavenly substance. Furthermore, the immediate context of vv. 42–44a places the σῶμα contrast at the climax of a series of contrasts that are more concerned with characteristics or modes of existence than with substance per se.³⁶ Lexically, the advocates of the bodily composition interpretation never properly address the concern about the suffix’s meaning, nor do they adequately address why Paul refers to the present body as σῶμα ψυχικόν if composition is his concern.³⁷ The definition Paul gives the term is a function of both contrast and content.³⁸

M. David Litwa attempts to vitiate this argument by suggesting that Paul could well have used σῶμα ψυχικόν as referring to composition:

In some way, the current physical body is made up of soul, if the soul is conceived of as the breath of life breathed into the earthly body in the creation account of Gen 2:7 (cited by Paul in 1 Cor 15:45). (The breath in Gen 2:7 does not appear to be an immaterial entity, but—like wind—something felt and physical.) Thus according to Genesis 2, humans in their current state are made up of two things: earth (thus Paul can call the first man ‘earthly’ …) and breath (the soul breathed into the earth by God). Put together, the earthly body inspired by soul (or breath) makes up the σῶμα ψυχικόν.³⁹

This argument is baffling equivocation if Litwa means to support the “composition” reading as it is typically articulated, which his pervious argumentation implies that he does. And if this is what he thinks “composition” means, all he has done is take the argument of the majority who link the terms to animation and say that they refer to composition. But then it would be difficult to determine what he thinks is so different about the “animation” or “governance” interpretation, unless he thinks that the latter distinguishes between animation and the substance animated whereas his interpretation simply sees animation as another substance of composition. In such a case, he would need to make a clear semantic case for when the “composition” interpretation applies and how to distinguish it from an “animation” or “governance” interpretation.

One other possible avenue by which “composition” interpreters could present their case can also be closed off here: Paul’s description of Adam and descendants as χοϊκός (“belonging to dust,” or “of dust”) in vv. 47–49. The Genesis story does state that Adam was made from the dust, but with this particular suffixed term, Paul is not stressing what Adam and his descendants are made out of, but what characterizes him (and them) by virtue of that origin (i.e., “belonging to dust” or being “of dust”). The role of this term in v. 48 shows that it is parallel to σῶμα ψυχικόν. In the same vein, the antitheses linked to Christ—ἐξ εὐρανοῦ in v. 47 and ἐπουράνιος in vv. 48–49—are not terms that convey his being composed of heavenly substance, but as having heavenly characteristics (defined by the parallel of σῶμα πνευματικόν) and being of heavenly origin. Once again, the definitions of the key terms are functions of both contrast and content.

Other scholars, such as Joseph Fitzmyer and Brian John Schmisek, have insisted that σῶμα πνευματικόν is simply an oxymoronic expression. Any attempts to define what it means are thus futile.⁴⁰ Fitzmyer’s basic supposition in this regard is that πνεῦμα is all that σῶμα is not.⁴¹ Schmisek similarly claims that Paul is deliberately ambiguous, “What Paul meant to convey by using the term is that resurrection itself is incomprehensible in human language.”⁴² There is certainly some truth to the idea that Paul is pushing the boundaries of language, even as he had a specific example in Jesus’s resurrection body for what he was expressing.

However, this interpretation only works if, as the earlier interpretation supposes, Paul is making a statement on composition. But the assumption of this interpretation runs aground in the face of what the “composition” interpretation adequately demonstrates: the texts from Paul’s era show no reason to think the Corinthians would have understood πνεῦμα as an immaterial substance. It is also not clear why this phrase would be an oxymoron, but nothing else in the series of contrasts in vv. 42b–44a constitutes an oxymoron, including the other three descriptors on the positive side of the contrast. By this same reading, the contrast to this phrase (σῶμα ψυχικόν) would constitute an oxymoron, but the advocates never take that step, as it would ruin the sense of transcendence that supports the apparent need for an oxymoron here.

It is more likely that Paul chose such terminology for at least three reasons. First, he had used the adjective πνευματικός several times already in this letter and his use of it here would be climactic as a reference to resurrection. Second, he actually meant to convey something rather than resort to deliberate ambiguity. Third, he understood this unique phrase as being pregnant with meaning in the context of this chapter and this letter.

But before I can outline that pregnant meaning, one other challenge to the popular “animation” or “governance” interpretation requires addressing. Frederick S. Tappenden argues that the union of somatic and cosmological meaning of the descriptors here, which I have been arguing for throughout this section, would be better conveyed by interpreting the bodily terms as meaning bodies “informed by” the soul or spirit, which is to say that an ensouled body implies a body-soul coherence on earth, whereas an enspirited body implies a body-spirit coherence in heaven.⁴³ For the present, believers belong to neither of these poles and are located in between as having an “enspirited earthly body,” combining terms that Paul uses throughout this segment, but never all at once.⁴⁴ Tappenden asserts three reasons for why this is preferable to the sense of “animated by” or “governed by” (which he summarizes as “subjected to”) more frequently assigned to the terms. First, it removes the ontological distinction implied by the more typical interpretation and better retains the unity of anthropology and cosmology that he argues for throughout his article, as well as the sense that the body and its complement need each other. Second, based on parallels Tappenden makes with Plato’s notion of body-soul antipathy, this understanding makes sense of Paul’s opposition between the heavenly body and the soul on the one hand, and the earthly body and the spirit on the other, so that what defines harmony or hostility is the combination of cosmo-somatic locations. Third, the notion of the body being subjected to “spirit” implies a certain personification of the spirit that Tappenden insists is alien to the first-century context, as opposed to later Trinitarian Christianity.⁴⁵

The third point is what is most important for Tappenden’s argument, as the first argument is hardly a strong point against analyses like mine and those I have cited (especially Harding, Kirk, and Thiselton). But it is curious that he has missed the obvious personhood of the πνεῦμα in the next verse, wherein the life-giving πνεῦμα is identified with Christ. More generally, as Gordon Fee has demonstrated at length, it is inaccurate to suppose that neither Paul nor his audience could have conceived of the πνεῦμα as personal.⁴⁶ The second point relies on questionable assumptions about Paul’s relationship with Platonism and is in any case moot if his third point falls. Additionally, it is strange that Tappenden would insist that this Platonist-inspired reading of Paul fits, while a reading using a framework more congruous with the early church would not. Even though many of the church fathers were, by any metric, more pronouncedly influenced by Plato and other Greco-Roman philosophers—or at the least more educated about their ideas—than Paul was, they missed the proposed parallel with—or influence by—Plato in this case. Could they not have interpreted the reference to πνεῦμα differently precisely because Paul himself (as well as those he taught) had some role in shaping how they interpreted his text?

With these various positions explored, I must now attend to the question of what Paul meant by the key phrase σῶμα πνευματικόν. The pregnant meaning of σῶμα πνευματικόν has at least three levels. One, it signifies the Spirit’s animation and governance of the resurrection body in the contrast to how ψυχή animates and governs the present body. Most scholars have noted this, but I think it is ultimately too restrictive an understanding in this context, not least because Paul’s other uses of the adjective confirm that the suffix has a more general sense of “belonging to.” In no other case does the -ικος suffix signify strictly “animated by,” including in the immediate context with reference to χοϊκός, and there is no reason for such restriction here. Rather, the uses may include “animation,” but only in the sense of what “governs” the people described, with the different -ικος adjectives serving as synecdoches for belonging to the present age (humans defined by ψυχή) or belonging to the age to come (humans defined by πνεῦμα; cf. 1 Cor 3:16; 6:19). Two, that broader sense of the suffixed term is helpful for signifying union with Christ the life-giver, who communicates resurrection life with the Spirit (vv. 44b–45). This includes governance and animation, but means something broader, for which Paul found the -ικος suffix helpful for being concise while thought-provoking. Three, considering the many observations made about the cosmic context of resurrection belief in this chapter, and considering the combined somatic and cosmic resonances of the previous contrasts, one should similarly see here that the phrase signifies the suitability of the resurrection body for the new creation, which will still feature bodies, but of a different kind according to God’s purposes. It will be a body more appropriate for a world in which there is a closer union with God than is possible in the present world, as the new creation is where sin, death, and their effects on mortality have been completely removed, and where the body and everything it interacts with will know the everlasting life of God, which is part and parcel of the kingdom reality of God being “all in all” mentioned in the rhetorically parallel segment.

This interpretation of the key phrase and the foundational nature of the link between union with Christ in the Spirit and the resurrection receive further support from other Pauline texts. Paul’s argument in 1 Cor 6:12–20 on glorifying God in the body is dependent, inter alia, on the logical link between resurrection (v. 14), union with Christ (v. 15), and the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit (vv. 17, 19). The Spirit also has links to Jesus’s resurrection, the renewed life believers experience now, and the future resurrection (Rom 1:4; 7:6; 8:9–10, 23; cf. 6:4; 1 Tim 3:16; Titus 3:4–7). Most clearly in Rom 8:11 and 2 Cor 5:1–5, Paul declares that the Spirit is the crucial link between faithful devotion to Jesus and the future resurrection. In short, the Spirit is the guarantor of God’s inexorable, faithful love in the eschatological action of resurrection, even as the Spirit is the one who forges the link of union.

Adam-Christ Contrast Continued

At this point, it is necessary to return to vv. 45–49, but with focus on the scriptural framework and how Paul uses it to articulate various worldview foundations of resurrection belief. In this segment Paul uses Gen 2:7 in v. 45 to provide contrast to Christ and the forthcoming resurrection, as well as to establish a spatial and temporal contrast that he continues to illustrate in vv. 46–49. Some scholars link Paul’s use of Gen 2:7 with Philo’s interpretation of this text in his works or to similar philosophical notions of the day (Creation 134–142; Alleg. Interp. 1.31–42; 2.4–5).⁴⁷ Philo contrasts two humans—heavenly and earthly—on the basis of Gen 1:26–27 and 2:7, in which Philo sees the heavenly man (i.e., the heavenly mind) succeeded by the earthly man (representing the earth-born and earth-bound mind) in 2:7. For Philo, the ontological order of these humans and the precise wording of the descriptions of Gen 1 and 2 demonstrate the ethical superiority of the heavenly human of Gen 1 to the earthly human of Gen 2. While God has been generous in giving all people life and a mind, what pleases God and bears God’s image is the heavenly, pure mind receptive to the Spirit of God (cf. Leg. 1.89).⁴⁸

However, this theory has several demonstrable flaws that undermine its probability. Paul’s eschatological focus in this contrast has little to do with Philo, and there is no clear evidence that Paul in any way shapes his argument as a response to Philonic ideas.⁴⁹ Although some of Paul’s vocabulary has superficial links to Philo’s interpretation, Paul’s locative/cosmological contrast of earthly and heavenly is inextricably linked to his temporal/eschatological one of “first” and “last.” Paul’s argument obviously references creation and cosmological structures (esp. vv. 36–41), but Paul is ultimately arguing from the basis of that which undergirds both protology and eschatology: the creative power, wisdom, and will of God. Philo has no analogy for Paul’s contrast between the “first” and “last” Adam (Philo never refers to a “last” man), nor does he use the crucial language of ψυχικός and πνευματικός to contrast the progeny of these respective Adams (vv. 44–45).

The presence of other allusions and echoes also reinforce the eschatological/new creation interpretation of what Paul is doing with his use of Scripture in this text. The reference to image-bearing—or, more precisely, image-wearing—in v. 49 obviously resonates with Gen 1:26–27, but Gen 5:1–3 fits better into the logical structure of the passage. After all, v. 49 refers to wearing the image of Adam and of the last Adam, but not the image of God per se, in accordance with how Gen 5:3 describes Seth.⁵⁰ Likewise, Paul’s emphasis is on wearing the image of the last Adam via the coming resurrection, as the believers have already worn the image of the first Adam via their birth. Benjamin Gladd similarly observes regarding v. 45 that, “Being created as a ‘living being’ and receiving the ‘breath of life’ (2:7) is functionally equivalent to being made in the image of God (1:27–28).”⁵¹ Paul is thus continuing his contrast between Adam and Christ as one between the image-bearer of God who characterized the old age, fell, and brought death to the world (cf. vv. 21–22, 54–56) and the image-bearer of God who characterizes the new age, arose, and brought life to the world (cf. vv. 20–23, 45, 54–57).

A further implication of the image language used here is the restoration of rule after the model of Christ, as J. Richard Middleton notes,

From the beginning, God’s intent for human life was centered on the royal status of humanity and our commission to image our creator in loving and wise stewardship of the earth which has been entrusted to our care (Gen. 1:26–28; 2:15; Ps. 8:4–8)…. Since resurrection is God’s restoration of human life to what it was meant to be, it naturally requires the fulfillment of the original human dignity and status, which have been compromised by sin. Resurrection, therefore, when biblically understood, cannot be separated from the fulfillment of the cultural mandate.⁵²

In addition to being an implication of the descriptions of the resurrection body as being in “glory” and “power,” this conceptual connection is also suggested by the use of Pss 8 and 110 in the rhetorically parallel segment. Although the direct use of these collocated texts is at some distance from vv. 42–49, the allusion is likely still reverberating metaleptically through this unit that parallels vv. 20–28. Thus, this segment features at least a conceptual allusion to Pss 8:5–6 and 110:1 via the use of “glory” and the evocation of the proper linkage of wearing the “image” and exercising “rule” entailed in Gen 1 and Ps 8. Resurrection fulfills these scriptures in the sense of enabling humans to fulfill their proper function by being image-bearers of the risen one who conquered death. But this fulfillment will only be able to occur in the coming consummation of the eschatological kingdom of God and the new creation, even if Paul elsewhere describes a sense in which there is non-bodily image renewal in the present prior to resurrection (2 Cor 3:18; Gal 3:27; Col 3:10).⁵³

The Gen 2:7 quotation and the subsequent expansion in v. 45 may also reverberate another echo in the form of Ezek 37:9 or 14 (the two verses are so similar that it is difficult to distinguish allusions to them without more extensive verbal coherence).⁵⁴ The Ezekiel text similarly evokes the description of the human’s creation in Gen 2:7 to portray the resurrection/reconstitution of Israel. Between the two verses, the MT and LXX use the Hebrew and Greek terms (רוח and πνεῦμα respectively) in all of their common senses of breath, wind, and spirit/Spirit. As in Gen 2:7, this gift from God is the final essential ingredient to make the non-living material—or, in the case of Ezekiel, the material of the thoroughly dead—into a living being. Paul’s description of Jesus as life-giving Spirit in v. 45 is reminiscent of this resurrection imagery, although the resurrection in this chapter is not metaphorical, as it is in the Ezekiel text. At the same time, resurrection functions as synecdoche in both Ezekiel and 1 Corinthians for the cosmic-scale hopes portrayed therein.

In general, more explicitly than vv. 42b–44a, the contrasts of vv. 45–49 indicate that Paul is stating his eschatological hope in protological terms.⁵⁵ The thoroughgoing contrasts between Adam and Christ, the earthly human and the heavenly human, and the earthly progeny and the heavenly progeny all illustrate the significant discontinuity between the present humanity in the present state of creation with the eschatological humanity in the eschatological state of resurrection and new creation. Still, the undergirding logic—as signified by the citation of Ps 8 in the rhetorically parallel unit, the reference to a “last” Adam, and the language of image-bearing—is that the eschatological state, finally, fulfills God’s creative intention for the protological state. Paul expects that God will give humans bodies fit for the purposes of the new age and new creation, just as God has designated bodies to operate in particular spheres for particular purposes in the present one (vv. 39–42a).

Paul’s hermeneutical use of Scripture can thus most likely be classified as typological, as Paul describes Jesus in terms that correspond to and surpass Adam, as well as in ways that properly fulfill the creative will of God for Adam. As Adam passed on the pattern of his image to his descendants, Jesus will pass on the pattern of his image to his descendants of faith via resurrection. Wright captures this logical flow well:

That is the point to which he is now building up, explaining that the unique, prototypical image-bearing body of Jesus is to be the model for the new bodies that Jesus’ people will have. But he intends to get there not just by saying that the creator will accomplish this through the Spirit, but by the route he had already proposed in verses 20-28: Jesus himself, the Messiah who is already ruling the world under the father, and will finally hand it over to the father once all enemies have been overthrown, is the one who himself gives the Spirit which brings people to that new bodily life in which they will share his own new image-bearingness.⁵⁶

As Jesus is the antitype for Adam, he is the prototype of the resurrection.

The declaration of Jesus as the life-giving Spirit emerges as an effect of the gospel events Paul has proclaimed to the Corinthians, an effect that Paul himself (by virtue of encountering the risen Christ) and the Corinthians (by virtue of their reception of the Spirit) have experienced. Paul often implicitly and explicitly describes his own experience of encounter with the risen Christ and the aftermath thereof as transformative and life-giving (1 Cor 15:8–10; 2 Cor 3:6, 18; 4:4–6; Gal 3:19–20; Phil 3:4b–11; cf. 2 Cor 5:17).⁵⁷ Stephen Hultgren states that Paul’s experience of Jesus led him to believe that, “As the image of God par excellence the risen Christ is both the representation of God in the likeness of human form (cf. Ezek. 1.26-28) and the representation of man in (and as) the image of God (cf. Gen. 1.26-27).”⁵⁸ This encounter with the risen Christ also gave Paul the template for describing the future resurrection of believers, although Paul must strain his descriptive ability here and in other texts such as 2 Cor 4:13–5:10. In some cases, he must rely on scriptural language, but even that takes him only so far in describing what is beyond typical human experience. In any case, what the particular texts evoked help convey for Paul is his connection of protology to eschatology. He could thus define both the present experience of salvation and the future hope in terms of new creation (cf. 2 Cor 5:17).

1. N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, vol. 3 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 312.

2. Irenaeus, Haer. 5.6–7; 5.9.3–4; 5.11.2; 5.12.2; Tertullian, Res. 49–53; 57; 60–63; Athenagoras, Res. passim; Origen, Princ. 2.10–11; 3.6.4–9; Cels. 4.57; 5.10, 19–24; Methodius of Olympus, Res. 2.18; 3.16; Pamphilius of Caesarea, Pref. Ruf. 3–5; Apol. 134; 137; 139; Didymus of Alexandria, Comm. Pss. 259; Comm. 1 Cor. 15:42–46; Gregory of Nyssa, Anim. Res. (NPNF² 5:466–67); Hom. Opif. 22.3–6; 24–29; Epiphanius, Anc. 89–90; Pan. 64.64; John Chrysostom, Hom. 1 Cor. 41–42; Jerome, Jo Hier. 23–31; Augustine, Civ. 13.20; 13.23; Ambrosiaster, Comm. 1 Cor. 15:42–49; Theodoret, Comm. 1 Cor. 15:42–49; John of Damascus, Orthodox Faith 4.27; Albert the Great, Res. 4.Art.13–17; Aquinas, Comm. 1 Cor. §§980–998. For more on the medieval perspective that the four qualities described here are dotes given to the selfsame body at the resurrection, see Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 121–37.

3. The “sowing” language combined with “making alive” in v. 36 further anticipates the contrasts of vv. 42b–44a, albeit with less exact verbal parallels.

4. Andrew W. Pitts, “Paul’s Concept of the Resurrection Body in 1 Corinthians 15:35-58,” in Paul and Gnosis, ed. Stanley E. Porter and David Yoon, PAST 9 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 52 (emphasis original). Cf. Ware, “Paul’s Understanding,” 822.

5. Cf. Pitts, “Paul’s Concept,” 53. Either of these alternatives would be necessary on the reading of those like Jeffrey R. Asher, Polarity and Change in 1 Corinthians 15: A Study of Metaphysics, Rhetoric, and Resurrection, HUT 42 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 98, who says, “Nowhere does Paul say in vv. 42–44a that the same body that is sown is the one that is raised, a relationship that would be necessary if he were emphasizing temporal succession in these verses.”

6. James P. Ware, “Paul’s Understanding of the Resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15:36–54,” JBL 133 (2014): 823. He also notes cases in Matt 14:20; 22:30; Mark 4:27; Heb 4:8; 1 John 5:16.

7. Cf. Winfried Verburg, Endzeit und Entschlafene: Syntaktisch-sigmatische, semantische und pragmatische Analyse von 1 Kor 15, FB 78 (Würzburg: Echter, 1996), 184.

8. Similarly, Claudia Janssen, Anders ist die Schönheit der Körper: Paulus und die Auferstehung in 1 Kor 15 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2005), 191–95 describes the term as referring to God’s sphere of life in this context.

9. Similar uses to the above are notable in Wis 12:1; 18:4; Philo, Creation 82; Alleg. Interp. 1.51, 78; Sacrifices 63, 95, 97, 101; Unchangeable 123, 142–143, 151; Migration 13, 18–19, 199; Heir 118; Names 195–196. Also note its use for Pyr in the inscriptions Ephesos 641; 642; 652.

10. Dag Øistein Endsjø, Greek Resurrection Beliefs and the Success of Christianity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 66. For more on the immortal gods, see Endsjø, Greek Resurrection Beliefs, 39–45.

11. Sarah Harding, Paul’s Eschatological Anthropology: The Dynamics of Human Transformation (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2015), 88–89; David R. Kirk, “Seeds and Bodies: Cosmology, Anthropology and Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15:35–49” (PhD diss., University of Aberdeen, 2015), 207–8; Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 2000), 1272.

12. Cf. Preston Sprinkle, “The Afterlife in Romans: Understanding Paul’s Glory Motif in Light of the Apocalypse of Moses and 2 Baruch,” in Lebendige Hoffnung – Ewiger Tod?! Jenseitsvorstellungen im Hellenismus, Judentum und Christentum, ed. Michael Labahn and Manfred Lang, ABG 24 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2007), 201–33.

13. Sprinkle, “Afterlife in Romans,” 219.

14. Kirk, “Seeds,” 209; Thiselton, Corinthians, 1270–71, 1273.

15. Mehrdad Fatehi, The Spirit’s Relation to the Risen Lord in Paul, WUNT 2/128 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 283; Murray J. Harris, “Resurrection and Immortality in the Pauline Corpus,” in Life in the Face of Death, ed. Richard N. Longenecker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 158–59.

16. It is notable that in several of the texts that illustrate the theme of union with Christ in this letter, Paul also refers to the presence of the Spirit (3:16; 6:19; 12:3–4, 7–9, 11, 13).

17. Murray J. Harris, Raised Immortal: Resurrection and Immortality in the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), 148; Janssen, Anders, 201–2; Wolfgang Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther (1 Kor. 15,1-16,24), EKKNT 7/4 (Düsseldorf: Benziger; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2001), 299, 306; Margaret E. Thrall, “Paul’s Understanding of Continuity between the Present Life and the Life of the Resurrection,” in Resurrection in the New Testament: Festschrift J. Lambrecht, ed. R. Bieringer, V. Koperski, and B. Lataire, BETL 165 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 297–98.

18. Schrage, Korinther, 306.

19. James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1998), 261.

20. A further layer to this last text is that it in turn alludes to Gen 2:7 to describe the resurrection action as an act of new creation.

21. Dunn, Theology, 262; Fatehi, Spirit’s Relation, 282; Christian Wolff, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, THKNT 7 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2000), 409–10. Pace Andreas Lindemann, Der erste Korintherbrief, HNT 9/1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 360.

22. Fatehi, Spirit’s Relation, 304–5. Cf. David Abernathy, “Christ as Life-giving Spirit in 1 Corinthians 15:45,” IBS 24 (2002): 5.

23. Dunn, Theology, 263.

24. Dunn, Theology, 265.

25. Dunn, Theology, 265.

26. Wright observes that this description of the resurrection body that first appears in v. 44 is, “the most elegant way [Paul] can find of saying both that the new body is the result of the Spirit’s work (answering ‘how does it come to be?’) and that it is the appropriate vessel for the Spirit’s life (answering ‘what sort of thing is it?’)”. Wright, Resurrection, 354 (emphases original).

27. BDAG, s.v. “πνευματικός”; Scott Brodeur, The Holy Spirit's Agency in the Resurrection of the Dead: an Exegetico-Theological Study of 1 Corinthians 15:44b-49 and Romans 8:9-13, TGST 14 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 2004), 99–100; Pierre Chantraine, Études sur le Vocabulaire Grec (Paris: Librairie Klincksieck, 1956), 170; Jacob Kremer, “πνευματικός, πνευματικῶς,” EDNT 3:122–23; James H. Moulton and Wilbert F. Howard, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament, vol. 2: Accidence and Word-Formation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1920), 359, 378; Thiselton, Corinthians, 1276–77; Wright, Resurrection, 349–52.

28. Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, PNTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Cambridge: Apollos, 2010), 816–18; Moulton and Howard, Grammar, 378; Thiselton, Corinthians, 1277–78; Ware, “Paul’s Understanding,” 832; Ben Witherington III, Jesus, Paul and the End of the World: A Comparative Study in New Testament Eschatology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992), 198.

29. Irenaeus, Haer. 5.6.1; 5.7.2; 5.8–9; Tertullian, Marc. 5.10; John Chrysostom, Hom. 1 Cor. 41.5; Augustine, Civ. 13.20; 22.21; Theodoret, Comm. 1 Cor. 15:44; Albert the Great, Res. 2.Q3.S4; Stefan Alkier, “The Reality of the Resurrection: The New Testament Witness, trans. Leroy A. Huizenga (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2013), 27; E.-B. Allo, Saint Paul: Première Èpitre aux Corinthiens, 2nd ed. (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1956), 424; Kenneth E. Bailey, Paul Through Mediterranean Eyes: Cultural Studies in 1 Corinthians (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press Academic, 2011), 461, 464–66; C. K. Barrett, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, BNTC (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1968), 372–73; Timothy A. Brookins and Bruce W. Longenecker, 1 Corinthians 10-16: A Handbook on the Greek Text, BHGNT (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2016), 174; John Calvin, Commentary on Corinthians, vol. 2, trans. John Pringle (Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2009): 41–42, https://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/calcom40.pdf 41–42; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 816–18; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians, SP 7 (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1999), 568; William Lane Craig, “The Bodily Resurrection of Jesus,” in Gospel Perspectives: Studies of History and Tradition in the Four Gospels, vol. 1, ed. R. T. France and David Wenham (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1980), 58; M. E. Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body: A Study of I Corinthians 15, SBT 1/36 (London: SCM, 1962), 81–82; E. Earle Ellis, “Sōma in First Corinthians,” Int 44 (1990): 142; Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, rev. ed., NICNT (Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2014), 869–70; Paul Gardner, 1 Corinthians, ZECNT (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 711–12; David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians, BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 734–35; John Gillman, “Transformation in 1 Cor 15,50-53,” ETL 58 (1982): 328–29; F. W. Grosheide, Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), 385; Robert H. Gundry, Sōma in Biblical Theology: With Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1987), 165–66; Harris, Raised, 120–21; Jean Héring, The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians, trans. A. W. Heathcote and P. J. Allcock (London: Epworth, 1962), 176; Larry W. Hurtado, “Jesus-Devotion and the ‘Historical’ Jesus: The Resurrection of Jesus as a Test-Case,” RCT 36 (2011): 120 n. 11; H. A. A. Kennedy, St. Paul’s Conception of the Last Things, 2nd ed. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1904), 250–52; Hans Kessler, Sucht den lebenden nicht bei den Toten: Die Auferstehung Jesu Christi in biblischer, fundamentaltheologischer und systematischer Sicht (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1985), 336; Kirk, “Seeds,” 215–17; Simon J. Kistemaker, Exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1993), 573–74; Jacob Kremer, Der Erste Brief an die Korinther, RNT (Regensburg: Pustet, 1997), 356; R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Paul's First and Second Epistles to the Corinthians (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1963), 714–15; Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press; Nottingham: Apollos, 2010), 410; Martin Luther, “Commentary on 1 Corinthians 15,” 1 Corinthians 7, 1 Corinthians 15, Lectures on 1 Timothy, Luther’s Works 28, ed. Hilton C. Oswald (St. Louis: Concordia, 1973), 189–90; James Moffatt, The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, MNTC (New York; London: Harper and Brothers, 1900), 259; Gerald O’Collins, The Resurrection of Jesus Christ (Valley Forge, PA: Judson, 1973), 113; B. J. Oropeza, 1 Corinthians, NCCS (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2017), 215–16; Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians, 2nd ed., ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1914), 52, 372; Eckhard J. Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, Historisch Theologische Auslegung (Wuppertal: Brockhaus, 2006), 968; Lorenzo Scornaienchi, Sarx und Soma bei Paulus: Der Mensch zwischen Destruktivtät und Konstruktivität (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 258–59; Thiselton, Corinthians, 1276–77; Ware, “Paul’s Understanding,” 832; Witherington, Jesus, 198; Wright, Resurrection, 351–52; Dieter Zeller, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, KEK 5 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 512. Cf. Christopher Bryan, The Resurrection of the Messiah (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 59.

30. Cf. LSJ, s.v. “πνευματικός.”

31. Andrew Clinton Johnson has suggested that the use of ψυχικός is parallel to Paul’s use of σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα in Gal 1:15–16, “In 1 Cor 2:12-15, a ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος is one who lives on a merely human level, one who has not yet been transformed into a πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος—that is, one to whom the Spirit's ἀποκάλυψις has not yet come, enabling him or her to see reality in terms of the new creation rather than by the standards of "this age” Andrew Clinton Johnson, “On Removing a Trump Card: Flesh and Blood and the Reign of God,” BBR 13 (2003): 182. Cf. Andrew Clinton Johnson, “Turning the World Upside Down in 1 Corinthians 15: Apocalyptic Epistemology, the Resurrected Body and the New Creation,” EvQ 75 (2003): 292–96. As I argue elsewhere, this reading is confirmed by the use of the same phrase in parallel to the ψυχικός idea in v. 50 of this chapter.

32. Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Complete and Incomplete Transformation in Paul: A Philosophical Reading of Paul on Body and Spirit,” in Metamorphoses: Resurrection, Body and Transformative Practices in Early Christianity, ed. Turid Karlsen Seim and Jorunn Økland (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009), 124–29; Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 26–37; Engberg-Pedersen, “The Material Spirit: Cosmology and Ethics in Paul.” NTS 55 (2009): 183–86; Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 21–25, 104–36 (esp. 126–28). Cf. Asher, Polarity, 154 n. 17; 159–60 n. 32; Peter Carnley, The Reconstruction of Resurrection Belief (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2019), 73–99; Mark T. Finney, Resurrection, Hell and the Afterlife: Body and Soul in Antiquity, Judaism and Early Christianity (New York; London: Routledge, 2016), 111–12; Hans Grass, Ostergeschehen und Osterberichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956), 152–53; M. David Litwa, We Are Transformed: Deification in Paul’s Soteriology, BZNW 187 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 130–31; Alan G. Padgett, “The Body in Resurrection: Science and Scripture on the ‘Spiritual Body’ (1 Cor 15:35-58),” WW 22 (2002): 161–62; Jeffrey Earl Peterson, “The Image of the Man from Heaven: Christological Exegesis in 1 Corinthians 15:45–49” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1997), 128–30; Jerry L. Sumney “Post-Mortem Existence and the Resurrection of the Body in Paul,” HBT 31 (2009): 13–21.

33. On the latter point, see texts discussed in Engberg-Pedersen, “Complete,” 124–25; Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, 20–21; Engberg-Pedersen, “Material Spirit,” 179–97; Martin, Corinthian Body, 3–15, 115–17, 127–29; Frederick S. Tappenden, “Embodiment, Folk Dualism, and the Convergence of Cosmology and Anthropology in Paul’s Resurrection Ideals,” BibInt 23 (2015): 441–45, 447.

34. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, 28 (emphasis original).

35. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, 32–37.

36. Thiselton, Corinthians, 1277. N. T. Wright, “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body: All for One and One for All: Reflections on Paul’s Anthropology in His Complex Contexts,” in Pauline Perspectives: Essays on Paul, 1978–2013 (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 465 has argued that, if anything, the Spirit will make the body more solid, more substantial (cf. Wright, Resurrection, 477–78). Héring, Corinthians, 176–77 makes much the same argument. Carnley attempts to catch Wright in a position of incoherency here as he claims that such statements imply an impact on material composition after all, “It is the role of the life-giving Spirit to ensure that the resurrected bodies of the dead are ultimately composed of material that is incorruptible in the sense of imperishable. Unfortunately, this puts paid to Wright’s thesis that ‘-ikos/-ikon’ words have an ethical and moral sense rather than an ontological one.” Carnley, Retrospect, 248. There are two problems with this critique. One, as is often the case in Carnley’s book-length critique of Wright, he paraphrases Wright using slippery terms that Wright does not use, in this case, “ontological.” Wright never makes such a distinction along these terminological lines (since it is possible to give the term both an ontological and ethical sense without giving it a “bodily compositional” sense). Two, Wright’s claim that the Spirit will have an impact on the composition of the body does not mean that he reads the term itself as referring to that composition by describing its substance, which is the position he argues against. It is a secondary implication supported by the surrounding context, not necessarily what the term itself conveys, and Wright does not claim such.

37. Kirk, “Seeds,” 215–16; James P. Ware, “The Resurrection of Jesus in the Pre-Pauline Formula of 1 Cor 15.3–5,” NTS 60 (2014): 489.

38. For more critiques of this approach, particularly as represented by Engberg-Pedersen, see Ware, “Paul’s Understanding,” 809–35; N. T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, vol. 4 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 1396–406.

39. Litwa, Transformed, 132.

40. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, AB 32 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 596–97; Brian John Schmisek, “The Spiritual Body: Paul’s Use of Sōma Pneumatikon in 1 Corinthians 15:44” (PhD diss., The Catholic University of America, 2002), 141–42, 187–88; Schmisek, “The ‘Spiritual Body’ as Oxymoron in 1 Corinthians 15:44,” BTB 45 (2015): 234–35. Cf. Alain Gignac, “Comprendre notre résurrection dans une perspective paulinienne: Les images de 1 Th 4, 13-18, 1 Co 15 et 2 Co 5, 1-10,” in Résurrection: L’après-mort dans le monde ancient et le Nouveau Testament, ed. Odette Mainville and Daniel Marguerat, MdB 45 (Geneva: Labor et Fides; Montreal: Médiaspaul, 2001), 297–98; Luke Timothy Johnson, “Life-Giving Spirit: The Ontological Implications of Resurrection,” SCJ 15 (2012): 82; Michel Quesnel, La première épître aux Corinthiens, Commentaire biblique: Nouveau Testament 7 (Paris: Cerf, 2018), 401.

41. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 596.

42. Schmisek, “Spiritual Body,” 142.

43. Tappenden, “Embodiment,” 449.

44. Tappenden, “Embodiment,” 449.

45. Tappenden, “Embodiment,” 449 n. 82.

46. Gordon D. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1994), 14–36, 827–45.

47. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, 32–37; Gerhard Sellin, Der Streit um die Auferstehung der Toten: Eine religionsgeschichtliche und exegetische Untersuchung von 1. Korinther 15, FRLANT 138 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), 90–135.

48. For more on this subject, see Stephen Hultgren, “The Origin of Paul’s Doctrine of the Two Adams in 1 Corinthians 15.45–49,” JSNT 25 (2003): 344–50.

49. Richard A. Horsley, “Pneumatikos vs. Psychikos: Distinctions of Spiritual Status among the Corinthians,” HTR 69 (1976): 271–80; Hultgren, “Origin,” 350–57.

50. Barrett, Corinthians, 377–78; Benjamin L. Gladd, “The Last Adam as the ‘Life-Giving Spirit’ Revisited: A Possible Old Testament Background of One of Paul’s Most Perplexing Phrases,” WTJ 71 (2009): 301–3, 306–8; Lindemann, Korintherbrief, 362–63; Jason S. Maston, “Christ or Adam: The Ground for Understanding Humanity,” JTI 11 (2017): 290–91; Mariusz Rosik, “In Christ All Will Be Made Alive” (1 Cor 15:12–58): The Role of Old Testament Quotations in the Pauline Argumentation for the Resurrection, European Studies in Theology, Philosophy and History of Religions 6 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2013), 212; Schrage, Korinther, 311–12; Thiselton, Corinthians, 1284, 1286;Wolff, Korinther, 411–12; Wright, Resurrection, 356.

51. Gladd, “Last Adam,” 307.

52. J. Richard Middleton, A New Heaven and a New Earth: Reclaiming Biblical Eschatology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 154.

53. Romans 8:29 further applies the conformation to the image to the entirety of Christian existence, past, present, and future. Cf. J. R. Daniel Kirk, Unlocking Romans: Resurrection and the Justification of God (Grand Rapids; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2008), 143.

54. Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 820; Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 265; Oropeza, 1 Corinthians, 217; Rosik, “In Christ”, 194; Bernardin Schneider, “The Corporate Meaning and Background of 1 Cor 15,45b—‘O Eschatos Adam eis Pneuma Zōiopoioun,” CBQ 29 (1967): 463, 465.

55. For more on this point, see Brodeur, Holy Spirit’s Agency, 249–55; Paul J. Brown, Bodily Resurrection and Ethics in 1 Cor 15, WUNT 2/360 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 199; Kirk, “Seeds,” 171–72; Schnabel, Korinther, 970–71; Wright, Resurrection, 341, 353–56.

56. Wright, Resurrection, 354. Cf. Schrage, Korinther, 313.

57. Hultgren, “Origin,” 367–68.

58. Hultgren, “Origin,” 369.