Worldview Analysis, Part 5
The Third Component of Praxis
(avg. read time: 2–4 mins.)
The component of praxis is what Wright defines as, “a way-of-being-in-the-world.”1 Given the obvious association of praxis with action, as Wright himself recognizes, it might be better to summarize this component as “a way-of-being-and-doing-in-the-world.” Praxis in this context refers to action, habits, characteristics/virtues associated with them, and, at least implicitly, the “vision for life” constituted in a sense of good and evil, of right and wrong. Yet, the nature of the relationship between worldview and praxis, especially in terms of action, is probably the most controversial of all the components. Is action simply the outcome of belief or presupposition? Or can actions function more as a first-order expression of worldview on par with the other components?
In the context of cultural analysis, Kearney states the typical assumption of the relationship, at least in the West, as, “Our link from these abstractions to behavior is the theoretical bias that specific world views result in certain patterns of action and not others. Therefore, knowledge of a people’s world view should explain aspects of their cultural behavior.”2 Similarly, Koltko-Rivera affirmatively answers the question of whether or not worldviews causally shape cognition, affect, and behavior by appealing to four lines of evidence: “cultural differences in cognition, ethnocultural differences in values, the explicitly labeled worldview research literature, and research on the differential effects of religious belief and experience.”3 However, while these lines of evidence show that worldviews make a difference for conduct, they do not necessarily indicate that the action is a result or an effect of the worldview; that posited relationship stems from assumption.
Martin Riesebrodt, although referring more specifically to religion than to worldviews per se, asserts that the scholars who often posit such a relationship are essentially projecting their own intellectual fascination with a given body of knowledge or belief, “At the beginning of the analysis stands a systematized body of knowledge that is as a rule reserved for intellectuals. The practitioners—laypersons and clergy—are unfamiliar with this knowledge, at least in its complexity, systematicity, and entirety.”4 Indeed, Christian Smith argues that practices do not derive their meaning(s) simply from what individual actors assign to them in light of consciously held beliefs. Practices may, even more typically, be functions of the influence of inculcation, institutionalized voices, traditions, scriptures, and so on.5 Furthermore, practices are themselves formational, “People need to start engaging in the prescribed practices and, it is hoped, as a result they should over time find themselves transformed in spirit and mind…. The sheer doing of them helps to bring into being that which they also embody.”6 As such, the relationship between actions/practices (as well as the larger praxis of which they are a part) and the larger worldview does not appear to be a one-way cause-and-effect chain.
A further complication emerges in the form of what all the worldviews in question refer to as “sin.” People regularly violate—intentionally or unintentionally—their deeply held sense of right and wrong. People may understand what they should value, but some other factor besides their “true worldview” causes them to place more immediate value on something else. That observation does not mean that actions cannot reveal the true worldview that someone inhabits as opposed to the beliefs the person proclaims—they certainly can—but it does highlight that the relationship is not always clear. If both beliefs and practices are formational, it only makes sense that people would imperfectly embody beliefs, actions, and their overarching worldviews.
As such, Sheikh suggests reframing this relationship in light of the consideration of what makes for a strong relationship between worldview and actions: “When actors have a combination of well-defined principled [ethical] beliefs, in which the pathway to achieve their objectives is powerfully defined [such as with simplicity or less ambiguity], they are in possession of a strong narrative.”7 Instead of a relationship of causality, she suggests conceiving of it as, “a looser relationship in which X is related to Y, either by way of enabling certain kinds of behavior or by justifying behavior. In the second case, worldviews are seen as playing a role in guiding human behavior, leading it onto certain action tracks while obscuring other tracks without asserting direct causality.”8 In light of these factors, it is justifiable to assert praxis as a distinct worldview component function on par with the others, rather than one that is hierarchically lower.
This formation of a way-of-being-and-doing in the world is part and parcel of the formation of humans. When things go wrong in such formation, the results can have disastrous consequences. Of course, praxis also plays a key role in other aspects of worldview formation as well. Holding onto traditional or normal praxis in the face of pressure—passive or active—to assimilate is a critical aspect of worldview maintenance, especially as it relates to a sense of identity. Likewise, a regular component of worldview deconstruction is deconstructing praxis, including by abandoning practices no longer deemed fit for purpose or undermining the vision of this way-of-being-and-doing in the world. Worldview reconstruction perhaps most notably manifests in (primarily) embodying a new praxis or (secondarily) reframing praxis towards new goals in light of a new vision.
Wright, New Testament, 124.
Kearney, World View, 53.
Koltko-Rivera, “Psychology,” 23. For exposition, see Koltko-Rivera, “Psychology,” 23–25.
Riesebrodt, Promise, 80. Cf. Christian Smith, Religion: What It Is, How It Works, and Why It Matters (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 31–32.
Smith, Religion, 33.
Smith, Religion, 45.
Sheikh, “Worldview Analysis,” 164.
Sheikh, “Worldview Analysis,” 164.