Worldview Analysis, Part 1

Defining "Worldview"

(avg. read time: 6–11 mins.)

Another aspect of my dissertation methodology that I would like to orient my readers to now is what is called “worldview analysis.” Such a field of study has been approached from several angles. The concept first emerged from the study of philosophy, but it has been adapted and utilized for so many fields that it is difficult to identify it as having a “native” academic field anymore. In exploring this subject here, I will proceed in six parts. The first part explores issues in defining the concept of “worldview.” The second part orients readers to the variety of worldview models available and the tasks for which they might be useful. The last four parts will be shorter posts dedicated to outlining the different components of the worldview model of N. T. Wright that I used in my dissertation.

For this first part, we should clarify what it will mean to “define” the concept of “worldview.” Since the term “worldview” is an analytical construct to use for understanding something that humans adhere to and sometimes reflect upon, the definition of the term can be particularly slippery. And, of course, what it means to “define” something can be more slippery than people often realize. André Droogers has described several possibilities of what it means to “define” something.¹ On one level, it can simply involve clarifying what a person means when the person uses the term. But beyond that, a definition is important for giving others a means of interacting with one’s conceptions by establishing a relevant scope of inquiry and identifying characteristics. In terms of categories, scholars have tended to favor “centered set” approaches to definition that provide identifiable and meaningfully distinct characteristics without overly arbitrary limitations of “closed set” approaches. (As an example of where these approaches may differ, consider the famous debate about whether or not Pluto is a planet; according to a centered set approach it always has been, but a certain popular closed set approach has ruled that it is not because it does not adhere strictly to all the view’s defined characteristics of a planet.) Hence, many, myself included, prefer the approach of Ludwig Wittgenstein in offering a “family resemblance” type of definition for worldview. That is, rather than attempting to identify the necessary and sufficient characteristics of a worldview, it is more helpful to identify possible traits to look for in the descriptive and classifying work of worldview analysis.

The concept of “worldview” has an extensive history that has drawn interest from a variety of fields of research.² The origin of this precise term is the German term Weltanschauung coined by Immanuel Kant, who used it only once in his Critique of Judgment (1790). In this context, Kant used it simply refer to the “sense perception of the world” (Welt + Anschauung), meaning that it had a similar sense to other preexisting German compounds, such as Weltbeschauung (world examination or inspection), Weltbetrachtung (world consideration or contemplation) and Weltansicht (world view or opinion).³ Such a concept was one way of expressing his epistemological ideas of distinguishing between noumena and phenomena, the thing in itself and a person’s perception of the thing. But after Kant’s initial solitary use of Weltanschauung, it quickly developed into a much more significant notion across a variety of contexts of describing a conception of the universe from a knower’s perspective.

In my dissertation, I listed the following eleven definitions of “worldview”:

• Diederik Aerts et al.: “a symbolic system of representation that allows us to integrate everything we know about the world and ourselves into a global picture, one that illuminates reality as it is presented to us within a certain culture.”⁴

• Clifford Geertz: “an attempt (of an implicit and directly felt rather than explicit and consciously thought-about sort) to conserve the fund of general meanings in terms of which each individual interprets his experience and organizes his conduct.”⁵

• Paul Hiebert: “the ‘fundamental cognitive, affective, and evaluative presuppositions a group of people make about the nature of things, and which they use to order their lives.’ Worldviews are what people in a community take as given realities, the maps they have of reality that they use for living.”⁶ Or, later in the same source: “It encompasses people’s images or maps of the reality of all things that they use for living their lives. It is the cosmos thought to be true, desirable and moral by a community of people.”⁷

• Kathryn A. Johnson, Eric D. Hill, and Adam B. Cohen: “Sometimes referred to in anthropology as ‘ordered universes’ (Klass, 1995), worldviews are the socially constructed realities which humans use to frame perception and experience (Redfield, 1952). A worldview involves how an individual knows and thinks about what is in the world, and worldviews influence how he or she relates to the persons and things in the environment.”⁸

• Michael Kearney: “The world view of a people is their way of looking at reality. It consists of basic assumptions and images that provide a more or less coherent, though not necessarily accurate, way of thinking about the world. A world view comprises images of Self and of all that is recognized as not-Self, plus ideas about relationships between them, as well as other ideas we will discuss.”⁹ Or, later in the same source, “the collection of basic assumptions that an individual or a society has about reality.”¹⁰

• Mark E. Koltko-Rivera: “sets of beliefs and assumptions that describe reality. A given worldview encompasses assumptions about a heterogeneous variety of topics, including human nature, the meaning and nature of life, and the composition of the universe itself, to name but a few issues.”¹¹

• David K. Naugle: “a semiotic system of narrative signs that creates the definitive symbolic universe which is responsible in the main for the shape of a variety of life-determining, human practices. It creates the channels in which the waters of reason flow. It establishes the horizon of an interpreter’s point of view by which texts of all types are understood. It is that mental medium by which the world is known.”¹²

• James H. Olthuis: “the integrative and interpretative framework by which order and disorder are judged; it is the standard by which reality is managed and pursued; it is the set of hinges on which all our everyday thinking and doing turns.”¹³ Or, later in the same source, “simultaneously a vision ‘of’ life and the world and a vision ‘for’ life and the world.”¹⁴

• James W. Sire: “a commitment, a fundamental orientation of the heart, that can be expressed as a story or in a set of presuppositions (assumptions which may be true, partially true or entirely false) that we hold (consciously or subconsciously, consistently or inconsistently) about the basic constitution of reality, and that provides the foundation on which we live and move and have our being.”¹⁵

• Brian J. Walsh and J. Richard Middleton: “A world view is never merely a vision of life. It is always a vision for life as well…. A world view, then, provides a model of the world which guides its adherents in the world. It stipulates how the world ought to be, and it thus advises how its adherents ought to conduct themselves in the world.”¹⁶ Or, later in the same source, “world views are founded on ultimate faith commitments.”¹⁷

• N. T. Wright: “Worldviews have to do with the presuppositional, pre-cognitive stage of a culture or society. Wherever we find the ultimate concerns of human beings, we find worldviews.”¹⁸

Apart from the use of the basic term, no singular thread connects all these definitions. Many emphasize assumptions or presuppositions. Many use language that implicitly or explicitly refers to a “frame” or “framework.” Many portray the concept as a symbolic reality. Some explicitly link it to action. Finally, as befits the language of “worldview,” many use visual metaphors for their definitions.

Naugle rightly observes, “There is simply no impartial ground upon which to stand when attempting to develop, promote, or criticize a thesis about this concept. Definitions, meanings, and models about ‘worldview’ are definitely not the result of presuppositionless thinking, but reflect the perspectives and interests of their originators.”¹⁹ As such, the term remains an essentially contested concept, much like “history” or “religion.” Furthermore, Paul Hiebert identifies three potential problems with the term and its use. First, the term tends to focus on the cognitive, but not the affective or moral dimensions of a culture. Second, the term itself prioritizes the capacity of sight over hearing, even though “sound” and its sub-categories (e.g., the spoken word) are more often considered the dominant sensory experience in a culture. Third, the term applies on both individual and communal levels, even though different dynamics are involved in the shaping of individual and communal worldviews.²⁰ Naugle also adds that in modernity, the term has often “carried the connotations of historicism, subjectivism, perspectivism, and relativism.”²¹ Likewise, in postmodernity, “As the personal, dated constructs of myopic selves or cultures, the status of ‘worldview’ becomes even more questionable … Worldviews slump to the status of a personal story in an age characterized by an ‘incredulity toward metanarratives.’”²² For similar reasons, adherents of the religious traditions described as “worldviews” may object to the term because of its implication that these traditions simply consist of subjective perspectives.

Still, neither Hiebert nor Naugle ultimately suggest abandoning the term. Because it is widely known and there is no better term, it is better to expand the concept than to get rid of it.²³ Naugle even compares using the term for Christian purposes to Augustine’s strategy of employing Greco-Roman philosophy for the Church, using the “Egyptian gold” for holy purposes.²⁴ He suggests the term itself is powerfully evocative, at least when one stresses the first half of worldview, of giving doctrines a cosmic context, so that, “their comprehensive scope, deeper meaning, and spiritual power is unleashed. This scope, meaning, and power, of course, is resident in these biblical doctrines themselves, but the framework provided by worldview enables them to be seen more clearly in their true light.”²⁵ I would also add that the integrative ability that draws these other characteristics together is part of what makes “worldview” a compelling concept and a useful one for analyzing the larger contexts of stories, actions, values, and so on.

In light of these considerations, my own definition of “worldview” draws especially on the definitions of Hiebert, Naugle, and Sire: a worldview is a commitment that fundamentally orients and integrates persons and communities—in terms of cognition, affection, valuation, and so on—that provides them a framework in relation to reality, which can be expressed as a narrative, a system of symbols, actions, values, presuppositions, and (in attempts to synopsize these expressions) articulated sets of beliefs. With this conceptual definition established, it is also necessary to consider other qualities of worldviews and how they form that will be important for this analysis.

Worldviews as such are often not subject to analysis and reevaluation as they are frameworks to which people have faith commitments, meaning that they have allegiance to them as reliable frameworks. However, worldviews are not simply given or simply received; they are also formed in various ways to improve their functionality as reliable frameworks and to form individuals. People engage in active formation (including construction, maintenance, deconstruction, and reconstruction) of worldviews insofar as they seek to develop a worldview that accounts for as many aspects of experience as they can.²⁶ While technically there are as many worldview variations as there are individuals, communities can unite around commonalities in worldview, and they can shape individual worldviews in such a way as to solidify communion.²⁷

What tends to bring worldviews to the surface for examination is encounter with other worldviews, crises that can be hostile to any worldview, and/or critical examination/interrogation, which can often happen either in the process of personal formation (such as when a child asks their favorite question of “Why?”) or when inspired by one of the other factors.²⁸ Such factors lead to worldview formation, which can take the form of construction (inculcation, development, or addition), maintenance (preserving a worldview in the face of challenge), deconstruction (when some aspect of a worldview or the worldview itself is deemed no longer fit for purpose), or reconstruction (i.e., transformation). Hiebert notes that the last type of worldview formation can occur in two basic ways:

Normal change occurs when changes on the level of conscious beliefs and practices over time infiltrate and bring about change at the worldview level. Paradigm or worldview shifts take place when there is a radical reorganization in the internal configurations of the worldview itself to reduce the tensions between surface culture and the worldview. In their own turn, these paradigm shifts reshape the surface culture. The relationship is two-way: conscious beliefs reshape worldviews, and worldviews mold conscious beliefs.²⁹

Again, formation of any of these kinds can occur at the individual or communal level. In the latter case, it will often occur through the influence of a particular teacher or group of teachers.³⁰

Finally, it is necessary here to clarify how “worldview” relates to other key terms used in worldview analysis. Like many others, I use “worldview” and “symbolic universe” almost interchangeably. If there is a distinction, it would be in the sense that the symbolic universe is the world as presented through the framework of the worldview. Furthermore, “worldview” should be distinguished from “ideology,” which refers primarily to socio-political orientation or well-established political ideas. One may argue that the latter is part of the former, but they are not identical. Furthermore, as Mona Kanwal Sheikh observes, there is frequently a Marxist connotation with the use of “ideology” as a “‘distorted vision of reality’ or superstructure that conceals the true nature of things and makes people perceive things that are not in accordance with objective reality…. This usage actually makes ideology irrelevant in itself or relevant only as a rhetorical tool to enhance matters that are viewed as being ‘more real.’”³¹

1. André Droogers, “Defining Religion: A Social Science Approach,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, ed. Peter B. Clarke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 270–71.

2. It is beyond my scope to outline the history here, but for such history and for more definitions, I direct the reader to Paul G. Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews: An Anthropological Understanding of How People Change (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 13–25; Michael Kearney, “World View Theory and Study,” Annual Review of Anthropology 4 (1975): 247–70; Mark E. Koltko-Rivera, “A Psychology of Worldviews,” Review of General Psychology 8 (2004): 3–22; David K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002); James W. Sire, Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2015), 23–69, 111–25.

3. Naugle, Worldview, 59.

4. Diederik Aerts, et al., World Views: From Fragmentation to Integration (Brussels: VUB Press, 1994), 18. Cf. Berger, Sacred Canopy, 19: “the socially constructed world is, above all, an ordering of experience. A meaningful order, or nomos, is imposed upon the discrete experiences and meanings of individuals.”

5. Geertz, Interpretation, 127. Here, he is describing how religion functions as a worldview prior to his exposition on how religion also functions as an ethos (127–41). Other analyses which describe religion as sign systems, incorporating worldview and ethos, include Hans-Josef Klauck, The Religious Context of Early Christianity: A Guide to Graeco-Roman Religions, trans. Brian McNeil (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 7–9; Gerd Theissen, A Theory of Primitive Christian Religion, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1999), 2–12.

6. Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 15. Cf. Sartini Sartini and Heddy Shri Ahimsa-Putra, “Preliminary Study on Worldviews,” Humaniora 29 (2017): 265–66.

7. Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 25–26.

8. Kathryn A. Johnson, Eric D. Hill, and Adam B. Cohen, “Integrating the Study of Culture and Religion: Toward a Psychology of Worldview,” Social & Personality Psychology Compass 5 (2011): 138.

9. Michael Kearney, World View (Novato, CA: Chandler & Sharp, 1984), 41.

10. Kearney, World View, 42.

11. Koltko-Rivera, “Psychology,” 3.

12. Naugle, Worldview, 330.

13. James H. Olthuis, “On Worldviews,” in Stained Glass: Worldviews and Social Science, ed. Paul Marshall, Sander Griffioen, and Richard Mouw (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 29.

14. Olthuis, “Worldviews,” 29.

15. James W. Sire, The Universe Next Door: A Basic Worldview Catalog, 5th ed. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009), 20. For explication, see Sire, Naming, 142–53.

16. Brian J. Walsh and J. Richard Middleton, The Transforming Vision: Shaping a Christian World View (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1984), 31–32 (emphases original).

17. Walsh and Middleton, Transforming Vision, 35. These logical connections are similar to how Ben Witherington describes a “symbolic universe” as that which is taken as, “inherently true and real,” and a “narrative thought world” as reflection on the symbolic universe “in terms of the grand Story.” Ben Witherington III, Paul’s Narrative Thought World: The Tapestry of Tragedy and Triumph (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1994), 6.

18. N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, vol. 1 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 122.

19. Naugle, Worldview, 254. Cf. Sire, Naming, 68: “The concepts involved in worldview thinking depend on the content of each worldview.”

20. Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 15.

21. Naugle, Worldview, 257.

22. Naugle, Worldview, 257.

23. Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 15.

24. Naugle, Worldview, 258. For his own exercise in pushing back on the subjectivist risks of the term “worldview,” see Naugle, Worldview, 260–336.

25. Naugle, Worldview, 342.

26. Aerts, et al., World Views, 18. On the feedback loop of worldview construction between the worldview itself and the world it aims to account for, see Kearney, World View, 44–45; Koltko-Rivera, “Psychology,” 38–39.

27. Naugle, Worldview, 270–72; Olthuis, “Worldviews,” 29–33; Anathea E. Portier-Young, “Apocalyptic Worldviews—What They Are and How They Spread: Insights from the Social Sciences,” in The Seleucid and Hasmonean Periods and the Apocalyptic Worldview: The First Enoch Seminar Nangeroni Metting Villa Vagnola, Gazzada (June 25–28, 2012), ed. Lester L. Grabbe, Gabriele Boccaccini, and Jason M. Zurawski, LSTS 88 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 108.

28. Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 47, 319–24.

29. Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 319.

30. Even in the case of Jesus’s resurrection, the work of a particular teacher—in this case, Jesus himself—accompanies a transformative, revelatory event.

31. Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Worldview Analysis,” in The Oxford Handbook of Global Studies, ed. Mark Juergensmeyer, Saskia Sassen, and Manfred B. Steger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 161.